

Gov 1790: American Foreign Policy

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Abstract

These are notes¹ for Harvard's *Gov 1790*, an undergraduate class on American foreign policy, as taught by Professor Joshua Kertzer in Fall 2022.

Course description: Explores America's role in global politics as explained by the major theoretical perspectives in international relations. Topics covered include American grand strategy, bureaucratic politics, the role of public opinion in foreign policy, and contemporary challenges such as anti-Americanism, the rise and fall of great powers, terrorism, and nuclear weapons.

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1 August 31st, 2022

Today we will discuss the motivation for studying foreign policy and overall structure of the class.

1.1 Logistics

We reviewed the [syllabus](#). Gov 1790 will be held at Maxwell-Dworkin G113 until Sever Hall is finished construction. The class is held Monday and Wednesdays 10:30-11:45 am.

This class is jointly offered as Gov E-1897 at the Harvard Extension School.

There will be weekly sections with TFs due Friday Sep 2. There are **no textbooks** for the class. All readings are on [Canvas](#). Each lecture has a reading guide and lecture outline. Note that the class has a Slack.

Course participation has two components: synchronous participation in section and asynchronous participation in Slack by responding to `#readingresponses` or helping answer questions in `#general`.

There are **three** guest lectures given by experts and scholars in the field. The lectures will be given on: US-China relations, nuclear proliferation, and emerging tech (drones, UAEs).

1.2 Motivation and structure

This past summer, there have been four major crises in international politics.

- **Russia-Ukraine.** The largest armed conflict in Europe since 1935.
- **Iran nuclear deal.** There have been efforts to revive the deal this summer.
- **Taiwan strait.** Chinese military exercises over the Taiwan strait, threatening Taiwan.
- **Afghanistan.** Humanitarian crisis post-Taliban takeover.

These four conflicts are related to the United States.

- **Russia-Ukraine.** The United States coordinated a remarkable united response in the international community. Moreover, the United States has provided a lot of military assistance.
- **Iran nuclear deal.** Faltered in 2018 because the Trump administration withdrew. Iranians know that Trump may be president again in a few years – there is nothing that Americans can *credibly promise* that a different set of preferences will take over the White House.
- **Taiwan strait.** U.S. Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, which China saw as a provocation.
- **Afghanistan.** United States withdrew, allowing the Taliban to take over the country.

The world's most pressing challenges are intimately related to Washington. A common theme with international conflicts is that when things go awry, other countries look to the United States to react.

The class is set up in two parts. The first part includes American grand strategy. One common metaphor we will use is a *two-level game*. We will spend the first half of the semester discussing the players in these games. We will explore the following questions:

- Biden v. Trump. Do more experienced leaders make better decisions?
- Civil-military relations. Military needs to be strong enough to do what civilians want them to do but subservient enough to *only* do what civilians want.
- U.S.-Russia relations. Why do US-Russia relations always fail?

We will then turn to three forms of violence and conclude by looking at two domains where technology has transformed American foreign policy: nuclear weapons and drones and UAEs.

2 September 7th, 2022

Today, we discuss IR theory and partisan politics. We will discuss realism. Next class, we will discuss liberalism.

2.1 Aftermath of World War I

We note that European countries suffered casualties (killed and wounded) on the order of 10^6 while the United States suffered casualties on the order of 10^5 , an order of magnitude less than our European counterparts.

We ask the question: how did a small regional conflict in the Balkans erupt into a global war? To begin to answer this, we need a *good* model of war.

There are both normative and positive aspects to answer this question. We are concerned with how international relations works (normative) and how to make sure war never happens again (positive).

2.2 Realism

Realists is characterized by the following:

- **Pessimism about prospects for cooperation.** For example, Napoleonic Wars, World War I/II. Believe that we should prepare for war to achieve peace.
- **Belief in an anarchic governmental system.** Believes that there should be no global organization to keep countries in check. Every state for themselves.
- **Power and material interest.** Belief that international politics is about self-interests. We should pursue power in order to ensure our own security. We should pay attention to the balance of power – when other countries increase their power, you should too (internal balancing), or forming alliances with other countries (external balancing). There is nothing worse in international politics than being in a small weak state with a powerful neighbor. For example, Poland, Vietnam.
- **Order over justice.** It is impossible to achieve justice (i.e. spreading American values, democracy, etc.) all over the world. Thus, we should strive to achieve *order*, at the very least. It is better to have a stable world than an unstable one.

2.2.1 Waltz's (1959) three images

Waltz provides three images or explanations for why wars occur:

- **The individual.** *Classical realism*'s emphasis on human nature. Wars occur because of individual actors and their lust for power over other individuals. The problem is that the world does not have too many individual leaders like Hitler, for example.
- **The state.** Domestic politics. Wars occur because of states' needs. Ideological differences fuel wars (i.e. Israel-Palestine). Nationalism is another mass phenomenon within the state (revolutions). Wars fueled by need for resources (i.e. Afghanistan, Japan).
- **The international system.** *Structural realism*'s emphasis on anarchy, polarity, and the distribution of power. Wars occur simply because there is nothing to prevent them from occurring.

Realists tend to talk most about the *first* and *third* images and not so much about the second. Realists care a lot about *polarity* or the distribution of global power over states.

There are two principles we can derive from media: *socialization* and *selection*.

- **Selection.** If we do not focus on individual power or other interests, we will no longer be in the system.
- **Socialization.** States watch each other to see what each of them are doing. For example, an Indian general remarked that you "should not go to war with the United States unless you have nuclear weapons."

2.2.2 Two dilemmas

Realists use two dilemmas in their arguments:

- The **Prisoners' dilemma** is a coordination game where there are two agents A, B with two actions, to cooperate C or to defect D . We note that $(D, C) \succeq_A (C, C) \succeq_A (D, D) \succeq_A (C, D)$ and the game has a Nash equilibrium (C, C) that is not *Pareto efficient*.
- The **security dilemma** is what occurs when one state's attempt of making themselves more secure makes another state feel less secure.

Example 2.1 (Russia-Ukraine crisis). Realists can apply a *security dilemma* to the current Russia-Ukraine crisis. After the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union led NATO and the Warsaw Pact. After the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., we see more and more post-Soviet states being added to NATO. Russia sees this as a threat and retaliates by invading Crimea and now invading Ukraine.

Example 2.2 (The Korean peninsula). North Korea is an isolated hermit state with two major allies: China and Russia. The Kim government has pursued ICBM missiles, after learning that the United States has often intervened in toppling states that *do not* have nuclear capabilities. The pursuit of these weapons (for North Korean security) has raised security concerns in neighboring states like South Korea and Japan.

Note (Offense-defense balance). Is it easier to acquire or hold territory or resources? If it is easier to acquire territory, security dilemmas would be much worse and vice versa.

3 September 8th, 2022

Today is the first section. Our Teaching Fellow is Kevin Troy and our section will occur Thursdays at 10:30 AM. Kevin will have office hours 2:00-4:00 PM in CGIS Knafeh Café.

3.1 Logistics

We reviewed the section syllabus. The first half of section will be review or preview of lectures. The latter half will be spent practicing the theory.

3.2 Three paradigms

Some words and phrases we associate with the three big paradigms introduced in the readings.

3.2.1 Realism

Realism is a *pessimistic* paradigm to international relations, based on power distributions and anarchy.

- **Balance of power.** The distribution of power

Unclear whether or not this is a *descriptive* or *prescriptive* approach to international politics. Power is material and hard power in this case, both of which are fungible assets.

- **Polarity.** There is a *unipolar* system with one great power and *bipolar* system with two great powers. This is used to describe the distribution of power,
- **Anarchy.** Absence of hierarchy in the international system.
- **Self-help.** Because there is no hierarchy, all states need to help themselves. No one gets to be the police.
- **Functional undifferentiation.** Domestically, the state is the enforcer of law. Internationally, all states are equal and have the *independent* power to govern their own states – they all have the same function. This is a logical follow-up to *anarchy*.
- **Balancing.** Recognizing that there is this distribution of power, we get into *internal* and *external balancing* via military development and international alliances.

3.2.2 Liberalism

Liberalism provides reasons why we should not be surprised by international cooperation. It is an *optimistic* framework that describes *cooperation*.

- **Kantian tripod.** This refers to democracy, trade, and institutions.
- **Institutions.** Institutions *reduce asymmetric information* and *reduce transaction costs* by providing opposing agents knowledge about cheating. Institutions also *facilitate linkage* in negotiation (giving up on areas where parties care less). And finally, institutions extend the time horizon in the game.

Example 3.1. In the prisoners' dilemma, the infinite repeated game has an equilibrium of (C, C) and cooperation is favored by both parties if we include future discounting.

3.2.3 Constructivism

Constructivism posits that social norms outweigh material interest in international relations. The alliances and attitudes and behavior of one state to another is dictated by identity, norms, and culture.

- **Identity, norms, culture.** This refers to the underlying shared beliefs, customs, and exercises that binds groups of people.

Example 3.2 (China-Russia relations). A contemporary example is Chinese-Russian relations. We note that President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin are expected to meet at a summit in Uzbekistan where they will discuss strengthening their alliance via military exercise and agriculture, energy, investment, and agricultural protection. We can consider the three paradigms to explain their cooperation

- **Realism.** China and Russia are engaging in *external balancing* to counter the United States-dominated world order.
- **Liberalism.** Russia and China are creating *linkage* to reduce conflict; this meeting is facilitated through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, *reducing transaction costs*.
- **Structuralism.** China and Russia have similar government *norms and identity*, rooted in socialism and communism.

4 September 12th, 2022

Please remember to sign up for sections Today, we will continue where we left off with realism and then discuss liberalism and constructivism.

4.0.1 Realism redux

Recall the *three images*: individual, state, and international system. Realism gives us some tools for understanding international relations – each state is looking out for their own interests in a self-help system. Thus there are no “bad guys” in war.

4.1 Liberalism

In the liberal family of theories, liberals are characterized by the following:

- **Optimistic about the prospects of cooperation in international politics.**
- **The system is best represented by interconnected webs and not billiard balls.** problems tend to spill over from one country to another.

Example 4.1 (Gun violence). After some U.S. states eliminated assault rifle bans, gun violence in Mexico (across the border of these states) increased.

Note (Idealism). There is a variant of liberalism in the 1920s, known as *idealism* that stressed the importance of values.

4.1.1 The Kantian tripod

In this main school of thought, domestic policies matter. Liberals often talk about the *Kantian tripod* to support cooperation:

- **Democracy.** There is a notion of the *democratic peace* which is the belief that democracies are less likely to go to war with other democracies. Democracies conduct their foreign policy publicly, so there are audience costs – the public and legislators can punish the chief executive.

Note (Critique). A realist critique of democracy is that these alliances may be rooted in acting in ones own self interest and maintaining a balance of power. Moreover, note that the United States is allied with many dictatorships and non-democracies, e.g. Saudi Arabia. Another counterexample is China. China does not fight democracies either, yet it is not a democracy. This could also have just been a coincidence.

- **Trade.** The notion that if two states are economically interdependent, the two states are more likely to go to war. Trade allows states to exchange resources without invading. People usually discuss integration, functionalism, and spillover effects.

– **Integration.** As two economies become more integrated, the opportunity costs of fighting change.

Example 4.2 (European Union). This is the idea behind the European Union. Britain and France used to fight again and again and again. With the formation of the EU, cooperation occurred in small areas and then expanded. This reflects a broader cooperation between states and the formation of a national European identity.

Note (Critique). Realists believe that interdependence is vulnerability. Realists would posit that because of this dependence, this increases the desire to go to war to acquire and secure these resources. For example, Japan’s invasion of China. Moreover, European countries provided much

more aid to Ukraine than anticipated; however, many of these countries get their oil and energy from Russia. It is harder for the U.S. and allies to apply leverage over Russia when Russia has leverage over them.

There is an economic trend towards *friend-shoring*, where companies want to keep their supply chains in allied countries, because the interdependence due to trade is harmful in times of crisis.

- **Functionalism.**
- **Spillover effects.**

- **International institutions.** These refer to institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, etc.

4.1.2 Liberal institutionalism

Liberal institutionalism is a type of liberalism that suggests that international institutions promote cooperation even among self-interested states. They do this by the following:

- **Reducing uncertainty (asymmetric information).** Recall the Prisoners' dilemma as a single-iterated and repeated game, there are different Nash equilibria.
- **Monitoring and enforcement.** Kind of like the first bullet point, enforcing rules and standards across the international community.
- **Lowering transaction costs.** It is hard to organize the logistics for meetings between diplomats or world leaders.
- **Facilitate issue linkage.** Helping heads of state negotiate on certain issues.

4.2 Constructivism

In the three schools of thought, we note that realists argue that states have *objective* interests: power and security. Liberal institutionalists believe that states have objective interests beyond security: trade, prosperity, etc. Constructivists believe that our interests are shaped by our identities and cultural contexts; they are subjective and intersubjective.

Intersubjectivity is like a collective unconscious.

- Who you are determines what you want.
- (State) identity, norms, culture shape behavior.
- States are not the only important actors in world politics.

Definition 4.3 (Norm). A standard of appropriate behavior for actors of a given identity.

Example 4.4 (Nuclear weapons). There is an international norm that we do not use nuclear and chemical weapons for war.

5 September 14th, 2022

There is an in-class exam on American grand strategy on Wednesday, September 21st, 2022. Today, we will finish our discussion of constructivism.

5.1 Constructivism

Recall last class, we had four examples as motivators for constructivism:

- Security communities
- Nuclear and chemical weapon taboos
- **Gender and race in war.** During World War II, the British did not like
- **The changing purpose of intervention.** Because of backlash from Latin American countries, states and people have been more critical of the United States for intervening in other countries' internal affairs.

These are all examples where norms and identity influence international politics, for better or for worse (gender and race in war).

5.1.1 Overview

We now have three frameworks: realism, liberal theories, and constructivism. We note the following:

- **Realism.** Realism is *pessimistic*. There are two branches:
 - Classical realism. Focused on the 1st image, the individual.
 - Structural realism. Focused on the 3rd image, the international system.
- **Liberal theories.** Liberal theories are generally optimistic. There are three branches:
 - Idealism. Focused on values.
 - Liberalism. Focused on the 2nd image, the state.
 - Liberal institutionalism. Posits that international institutions cooperate under anarchy.
- **Constructivism.** Constructivism is agnostic, focused on norms, identity, and culture.

5.2 Continuity and change in US foreign policy

There is a difference between theories of international politics and theories of foreign policy. We will now discuss the four schools that discuss the origins of American foreign policy.

We will discuss **Mead's four folkways**. These are four perspectives in how America conducts foreign policy.

5.2.1 Hamiltonianism and mercantilism

This folkway is outward-looking. This school posits that American foreign policy is driven by *trade and bankers*.

This is because of the belief that trade drives foreign policy. The United States is a continental trading nation separated by the Atlantic.

Example 5.1 (Great Britain). Note that the U.K. was separated from the European continent by water, the United Kingdom focused on developing their country and economy through trade. Because of this, this increased trading power made Britain a great naval power to enable trade.

The goal of American foreign policy is to maintain *freedom of the seas*. This principle is also known as *free ships, free goods*.

Hamiltonians (more generally) want the United States to open up markets; for example, "open-door" policies where the United States would open up other states' borders so the United States can engage in trade.

Hamiltonians support big government because they need strong executives, robust trading organizations and agreements to facilitate trade; they need the United States to *facilitate* and *engage* with the rest of the world.

Hamiltonianism is an understanding of American foreign policy where the American foreign interest is driven by bankers.

5.2.2 Wilsonianism and the missionary impulse

This folkway is also outward-looking. This school posits that American foreign policy is driven by preachers. Our notion of "civil society" comes from the missionary movement in the United States. This school started as missionaries but quickly adopted a broader human rights agenda; Geneva conventions, American imperialism to *civilize* and *Christianize* other countries.

Today, Wilsonians are supporters of nation-building, international law, NGOs fighting human trafficking and global warming.

5.2.3 Jacksonianism and the defense of the folk community

This folkway is inward-looking. This school posits that American foreign policy is driven by cowardice.

Jacksonians are strongly suspicious of centralized power, they dislike big business and big government. They are strong supporters of the military. Jacksonians posit that we should **not** concern ourselves with other states unless they attack. They do not believe in *limited wars*; they are populist, and think honor is important – self-respect, self-defense.

Jacksonians were originally Scottish-Irish immigrants from the Scottish Highlands. There is an idea of a "folk community," an internal group whose values they seek to maintain and an external group, who they see as an enemy.

Example 5.2. During the Cold War, the outgroup were the communists. In the early 2000s, the outgroup were Muslims.

They are willing to use overwhelming force only in outstanding circumstances.

Example 5.3. Donald Trump is a Jacksonian. Wanted to demand respect from other countries, use of force to make other countries respect him and the United States.

5.2.4 Jeffersonianism and the preservation of liberty

This folkway is also inward-looking. This school posits that American foreign policy is driven by Wakanda.

Jeffersonians believe that the American revolution is not over, and there is more work to be done to fulfill what the founding fathers intended to do. They believe that democracy is a candle in a dangerous world; we should thus protect democracy as it exists at home and not concern ourselves with other countries.

Jeffersonians believe in small government, they care about liberty. Foreign policy influences our liberty in two ways: externally, engaging may give rise to new international threats to America; and internally, due to conscription and taxes, limits our personal liberty.

They do not like war because it requires secrecy and taxation.

6 September 15th, 2022

This is the last section before the exam. We will review all material relevant to the exam.

There are many resources on Canvas. There is an exam study guide, lecture outlines, and reading guides. Read Professor Kertzer's prelude to the class.

Review central arguments in readings.

6.1 Mead's four folkways

We review two George W. Bush quotes related to foreign policy. We see that he shifts from a Jefferson and Jacksonian policy to a more Wilsonian policy in exporting American values abroad.

- **Hamilton.** Outward facing, markets/bankers, big government, trade.
- **Wilson.** Outward facing, religion/preachers, spread values, civil society (a second image argument — if other states' domestic policy looks like America, then it will reshape global relations).
- **Jackson.** Inward facing, cowboys, nationalism, big military, distrust big government/business and outside world, populist.
- **Jefferson.** Inward facing, liberty, distrust big military, domestic resource allocation.

6.2 Retrenchment and engagement

Retrenchment is a policy that assumes that the United States is engaged abroad (trade, military and economic alliances, etc.). There is a sense that after World War II, American foreign policy is characterized by engagement. It posits that we should withdraw and limit our engagement in other countries.

There are two readings, Posen (retrenchment) and Wright (engagement):

- **Posen.** One concept is *cheap riding*, that America is disproportionately contributes to alliances and other countries are able to contribute less and benefit. He also talks about *balancing*, both external and internal. There is a distinction between *hard* and *soft* balancing.

The United States is also historically bad at intervention. These bad interventions, Posen argues, is an *inevitable result* of a heavily engaged result to foreign policy.

Example 6.1 (North Korea). North Korean nuclear proliferation is a response to American overextension and a type of internal balancing.

- **Wright.** When America pulls back, we don't know what the response may be.

7 September 19th, 2022

Today, we discuss American exceptionalism and grand strategy.

7.0.1 Mead

Recall that for Mead, theories of international relations is different than theories of foreign policy.

Realism treats all states as equal, the only thing that differentiates them is relative power. The only thing that differentiates America from the rest of the world is our global power.

7.1 American exceptionalism

American exceptionalism posits that the United States is somehow *different* from the rest of the world, immune from the kinds of factors that shaped other countries.

America's difference can be attributed to some of the following:

- **Geography.** The United States has a unique and exceptional geographic position. We are surrounded by two friendly states and two oceans. If other states wanted to engage in conflict, they need to project their power over the ocean. This *stopping power of water* discouraged Europeans from quarrelling with us and allowed us to develop quickly.
- **Turner's frontier thesis.** When people want to escape strong central governments, Americans can move west to the American frontier. The nature of American politics will be more *liberal* than our European allies.

Constructivists would find these explanations dissatisfying. Constructivists would say that in order to understand American exceptionalism, we should accept exceptionalism as a social fact — that it is not just the United States that thinks the U.S. is exceptional, all other countries think so too.

7.2 American grand strategy

American grand strategy is a roadmap that tells us:

- What are our interests or goals?
- What are the threats to those interests?
- What tools are we going to use to address those threats?

The question of interest is: how involved should the United States be with the rest of the world?

American interests have been oscillating between two states. Fighting wars far away that the United States had no business fighting in (inward-looking); and a Teddy Roosevelt-esque (outward-looking) policy.

This spectrum or binarism has different names: introverted and extroverted, promised land and crusader state, isolationism and interventionism, retrenchment and engagement (Wright and Posen).

7.2.1 Contemporary American foreign policy

Historically, America had not-so-many foreign entanglements.

We look at recent special forces deployments. Even under Trump, America had substantial foreign policy engagement. The U.S. has military bases in all 50 states and in 41 foreign countries. The United States has three major foreign policy networks: NATO, QSD (Japan, Australia, India, U.S.), and engagement in the Middle East.

7.2.2 Trump doctrine

Under Trump, there was more continuity from Obama-era policies than we might think. Trump's rhetorical campaign was much more introverted than what he actually did in office.

Posen makes a case that liberal hegemony imposes two types of costs:

- **Reckless driving.** Because American allies know the U.S. will support their military, the allies engage in more reckless behavior.

Example 7.1. Israel spending money on colonizing Palestine instead of defense.

- **Cheap riding.** Because the United States will provide funding to international agreements and alliances, allies will not spend enough on their own defense.

Example 7.2. NATO and military spending targets.

Posen was interested in the security order and the economic order. Trump is concerned with just the economic order and not security ones. They disagree on how the United States should scale back engagement — Posen says we should scale back offshore balancing. Trump was obsessed with this 2% value for NATO military spending; Posen did not have a *lucky number*. We sometimes want specialization in alliances, and we care about *how* allies spend their money, not really *if* they spend it.

7.2.3 Biden doctrine

Biden presents a much more extroverted and engaged role in foreign policy. For Biden, America is a leader of a grand coalition of democracies — according to Biden, the most pressing issue of our time is the struggle between democracies and non-democracies.

There is a sense that the Biden administration emphasizes human rights much more than our allies, the notion that America is *back*.

If we look at Biden's advisers, they are some of the architects of R2P (responsibility to protect) — when citizens are struggling or persecuted by their governments, the United States has an *obligation* to protect them.

Biden seems to have an interest in using foreign policy to solve domestic problems, i.e. foreign policy for the middle class, using foreign policy to protect domestic spending.

It is worth keeping the following considerations in mind:

- **Opportunity costs.** Choices are difficult, opportunity costs are real. People like retrenchment but are often not supportive (or think about) of the consequences — we are restraining from places where the United States is there for a reason.

Example 7.3. Pulling military and troops out of Europe and Asia leads to less ally assurance and stability — countering adversaries in the region.

- **Counterfactual challenge.** We cannot criticize policy just because the outcome is bad. There are counterfactuals and things may be different to determine — but no knows if these things are true.
- **Whose interests matter?** We have discussed American grand strategy from the perspective of the United States — whether it is in America's interest to be restrained or engaged.

8 September 26th, 2022

Today we will discuss the president and Congress.

8.1 President and Congress: the basics

Articles I and II of the Constitution mandate shared powers in foreign policy:

- **President.** Chief executive, chief diplomat, commander in chief.
- **Congress.** Declare war and provide for national defense, appropriate funds, regulate international commerce, make laws to fulfill responsibilities as necessary.

Because power is shared, there is a kind of struggle between Congress and the president and have resulted in some restrictions. They include the following:

- **Reporting requirements.** Congress wants the president to tell Congress what they are up to. They want to reduce secrecy.
- **War Powers.** Includes the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964) and the War Powers Resolution (1973). In particular, the War Powers Resolution says that the president can only deploy troops under three conditions:
 - President declares war.
 - Statutory
 - Deployment amid imminent danger.

The president is expected to consult Congress before sending troops and is expected to continue to give updates.

If the president sends forces before declaring war, they must send a letter to the Speaker of the House. If war is *not* declared, the president cannot use forces for more than 60 days.

- **Controlling purse strings.** Congress can change how much money goes to the cause/deployment.
- **Congressional oversight.**

Other mechanisms include engaging in procedural or legislative politics, delaying other actions until properly reported to (legislative action). Congress can also hold hearings to bring the public, pass nonbinding resolutions, hold interviews and write news editorials.

There is a question of when Congress necessarily defers to the president – variation in oversight. Lindsay argues that when there are public threats, Congress will more likely defer to the president. Howell and Pevehouse argue that cooperation occurs when the president is the same party as the majorities in each chamber of Congress.

8.2 Trump, Biden, and Congress

There are many cases where Trump did things and Congress didn't do anything. For example, TPP, Iran nuclear deal, starting trade war with China.

One explanation is *increasing partisan polarization* in Congress and *declining foreign policy expertise*. This means that Democrats and Republicans don't cooperate anymore. When there is *unified* government, Congress will be extremely deferential, and when there is divided government, there is less cooperation.

This is why presidents turn to executive orders. For example, we entered the Iranian nuclear deal via executive order under Obama, so Trump didn't need to consult Congress to leave.

Note. There is a difference between law and government. Just because Congress is given powers in the Constitution (law) does not mean they will use it (politics).

8.3 Does it matter who the president is

There are three sets of reasons why international relations scholars would argue it does not matter who the president is:

- **Constraints.** There are both domestic and international constraints, some of which may be stronger under certain conditions.

Note. There are instances when people forget or discount *domestic constraints*. We know that constraints exist for ourselves but ignore them when discussing other countries. This is the *fundamental attribution error*.

- **Selection.** The president is selected via primaries, general elections, electoral college – this limits the type of people who can become president.
- **Socialization.** The idea is that institutions change people, that once people enter the presidency, the conditions and institutions surrounding the presidency changes ideas and values and priorities.

Example 8.1. Trump campaigned on certain ideas, but ended up strengthening relations. For example, NATO.

Saunders has a counterexample that shows that lots of foreign policy are missions of choice. She argues that presidents conduct military interventions differently because people come to the presidency with different backgrounds and assumptions and beliefs. These are counterarguments on leaders' *causal beliefs*.

Note. The natural extension is investigating the origin of these opposing beliefs. One explanation is that candidates have different experiences and backgrounds in life.

Individual characteristics may matter more when constraints are weaker. Constraints are weaker when there is more concentrated power, when we are in times of change (individual leaders can move quickly when legislature isn't as mobile), and when these constraints often work against each other.

9 September 28th, 2022

Today, we will discuss another set of presidential constraints: bureaucratic politics. Next week, we will discuss how institutional design principles can be applied to make better decisions and avoid psychological bias.

Example 9.1. Guantanamo Bay remains open even after commitments from three presidents; there is bureaucratic politics between the Department of Defense and the president.

In short, though these cabinet departments serve the president, they can still prevent the president from doing whatever he or she wants.

9.1 Two models of foreign policy

9.1.1 The rational actor model

This is model I (Allison). This model sees the government as a *unitary agent*, choosing a response to the strategic problem the country faces. The government thus sets strategic goals based on national interests, evaluates options, looks at consequences, and chooses the option that leads to the best possible outcome (maximizes utility). This is also discussed in by Marsh.

Note. This model is false, but useful – makes studying state interaction a bit easier.

This model is *not* useful to understand the following:

- Why do states misperceive their environment?
- Why do intelligence agencies fail to cooperate?
- Why do states behave in seemingly contradictory ways?

9.1.2 Bureaucratic politics model

This is model III (Allison). This model posits that where you stand depends on where you sit (Miles' law). Bureaucracies have their own interests, and individuals within these bureaucracies have their own agendas as well – a kind of *pulling and hauling* between agencies.

Your bureaucratic role determines what your view and agenda for foreign policy is.

Definition 9.2 (Pulling and hauling). Pulling and hauling refers to different government actors and agencies playing tug of war over priorities.

Example 9.3. The following are examples:

- **Dual-use technology.** The United States sold dual-use technology to Iraq in the 1980s. These are technologies that can be used in both civilian and military purposes. This was a struggle between the defense and commerce department. For example, high-performance computers, tennis racket strings.
- **Clinton emails, Trump infighting.** Agencies battle over the Clinton emails scandal. Trump administration infighting between government officials.
- **2003 Iraq war.** State department was opposed, generals at the Pentagon were opposed, but civilian military leaders were supportive.

These are examples of pulling and hauling *between different bureaucracies* (horizontal).

Another part of bureaucratic politics is how close you are to the president. The closer you are to the president, the more they will listen, the more authority you are perceived to have. Thus there is also pulling and hauling *between bureaucracies and the executive* (vertical). They want to do this because these departments have different visions for foreign policy.

Note (Weakness of state). The state department is relatively weak in international politics. This is because the state department budget is smaller than other departments. The state department does not have many resources (compared to the Pentagon). Many vacancies in Trump and Biden government.

No matter what direction you want American foreign policy to go towards, you cannot make policy if you have no policy makers.

Bureaucracies can make presidents' lives harder by:

- **Leaks.** Leaking can be a way for bureaucrats to invoke public outcry, for folks to save their own reputation, for bureaucrats can get at other bureaucrats.

As president, you have vested interest in containing leaks. Thus leaks can help get presidents do what you want them to do.

One problem with leaks is that if presidents were concerned about leaks, they may end up not making good decisions. For example, the Bay of Pigs invasion.

10 September 29th, 2022

Exams are returned! Today, we will discuss the president and the Congress.

10.1 Syria (2013)

A short summary of the crisis: in August 2013, Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons on civilians. President Obama had to decide what to do in response.

Note. This can be modeled as a *two-level game* where the President wants to do something abroad but must convince domestic bureaucrats.

There are some constraints in this case:

- **International.** Russia was a close military ally of the Assad government and sat on the United Nations Security Council. U.S. allies did not want to go all in on the issue after Libya.
- **Domestic.** Congressional approval is required for military engagement. In general, Congress can constrain the executive by:
 - **War powers.** Delayed voting on the issue, as Senate support eventually faded.
 - **Oversight.** Congress held hearings over the advisability, legality, and feasibility of the endgame in Syria.
 - **Swaying public opinion.** Letters released by congressional leaders to sway public opinion.
 - **Funding/purse strings.** Refusing to fund the war.
 - **Reporting requirements.** Requires executive to provide reports to Congress concerning military operations and engagements. These can be written – similar to *oversight* but oversight is typically associated with holding hearings.

10.1.1 Congressional support

Congressional support of executive is determined by:

- **Lindsay.** Congress will be deferential to the executive when there is an imminent threat. Threat leads to deference.
 - Uses a September 11th case where President Bush had two Democratic chambers of Congress (high threat environment).
 - Compares Bush to Clinton, where the opposite was true (low threat environment).

Note. Not quite clear what the cause for deference is.

- **Howell and Pevehouse.** Congress is deferential to the executive when the political parties of chambers of Congress and the executive are aligned. Party control leads to deference.
 - Howell and Pevehouse use a 2006 example where they look at some variation in an independent variable (threat or party) to see if there is some variation in the dependent variable (deference or defiance).

10.1.2 Executive power

Saunders makes a claim about presidential beliefs and actions. Internally-focused presidents pursue *transformative* interventions (regime-changing interventions) and externally-focused presidents pursue *non-transformative* interventions (limited strikes).

Note. Obama seems to be trying to engage in non-transformative interventions in Syria, possibly motivated by both internal and external motivations.

10.1.3 Bureaucratic politics

Example 10.1. Another Obama case is a 2009 downshift from goal of defeating the Taliban to disrupting the Taliban. Change of perspective from main threat being the Taliban to main threat from Al Qaeda (Marsh).

Marsh argues that the output of the decision of the 2009 decision is a result of intra-administration bureaucratic politics.

Recall the following:

- **Miles' Law.** Where you stand depends on where you sit.

Example 10.2 (Afghanistan surge). Secretary of Defense Gates and uniformed military officers advocated for military intervention. Secretary of State Clinton *also* supported military intervention.

They were on the same side of the debate to pair State and Defense resources to develop a more cohesive counterinsurgency strategy.

- **Pulling and hauling.** The tug of war across bureaucracy. There are two types:
 - **Horizontal.** Occurs along the same level of bureaucracy.
 - **Vertical.** Occurs vertically on the chain of command.

11 October 3rd, 2022

Today we will discuss two case studies of bureaucratic politics in action.

11.1 Case I: Intelligence failure

This is a case of institutional design and psychological biases.

11.1.1 Groupthink

In the bureaucratic politics model, if advisors and bureaucrats come from similar backgrounds (or if the president's preferences are public), they can engage in *groupthink* (Irving Janis). This is necessarily a bad thing if there are no different opinions and governments only have one consistent idea or policy to pursue.

Sometimes, we want a strong bureaucracy to avoid groupthink and challenge the president.

Some potential solutions are:

- President does not make their preferences public. For example, Trump tweets.
- Seek advice from members outside the group.
- Appoint by merit and not by loyalty. There seems to be a trade-off between these two values.
- Separate advisors into two groups.

Note. Groupthink was among the principal causes of the Iraq War, according to some study.

11.1.2 Stovepiping

Stovepiping has two different definitions.

During the Iraq War, the Bush administration built "stove pipes" to collect intelligence. This went as follows: as soon as there is any intelligence about weapons of mass destruction, they should use the stove pipe to send information directly to the White House. He wanted to bypass the intelligence agencies. But information that is not vetted or confirmed is bad information.

This is an example of a *confirmation bias* – any information Bush wanted to see came up to the top faster. There is also *disconfirmation bias* where we have a higher standard for evidence that proves us wrong than evidence that proves us right.

Competition is a good thing for advisors, so there are a plethora of ideas brought to the president. This is the second definition of stovepiping – competition between bureaucracies may lead to bureaucracies keeping information for themselves.

11.1.3 Intelligence politicization

This is a big problem for intelligence agencies and bureaucracies generally. The closer you are to the president, you transform from analyst to advocate (Rovner).

- Competition between bureaucracies can be a good thing and lead to better decision-making.
- We can design bureaucratic institutions that help avoid psychological biases (i.e. groupthink) but there can be side effects (i.e. stovepiping) depending on how you set these things up.

11.2 Case II: Civil-military relations

This is a case of institutional design and delegation. The central problem is: how does a civil government control its military?

If the military is too strong, civilians may fear them. If military is too weak, civilians are not protected. We want to make sure that the military is as strong as we want them to be but not too strong.

11.2.1 Principal-agent model

We introduce the principal-agent problem. There are two actors, a principal and an agent. The principal is delegating to the agent.

We can think of maintaining and choosing the military as a principal-agent model where the principals are the civilian bureaucracy and agents are the military. In order to make sure we are delegating to the *right* agents, we need to engage in some adverse selection. We can also provide additional military training. The other solution involves incentivizing obedience via monitoring mechanisms.

Currently, civil-military relations are unclear. Civilians (U.S.) seem to have a high standard for the military but doesn't really understand if the budget is too high or too low. People tended to trust the military more under Trump (Saunders).

12 October 5th, 2022

Today, we discuss public opinion.

12.1 Public opinion

There are two images of the public in foreign policy: the wisdom of the crowds and the folly of the crowds. We care about what the public thinks and whether or not it can be trusted.

We care about whether the public can be trusted because of demands of democratic theory. Moreover, the public applies constraints in the two-level game of international politics via audience costs.

The public shapes foreign policy in two ways:

- **Direct.** Public monitoring foreign policy behavior via ballot boxes, elections, etc.
- **Indirect.** Executive monitoring/anticipating public opinion; domestic opposition groups monitoring; foreign observers monitoring.

12.1.1 What the public thinks

We usually think about the public along two dimensions/orientations: cooperative internationalism (CI) and militant internationalism (MI) (Wittkopf).

CI is the notion that we want to work together with other countries to solve global problems.

Example 12.1. Cooperating with WHO, fighting child poverty, world hunger, etc.

MI is characterized by hawkishness – that America should use military force to solve problems. Military force is encouraged, that it is *necessary*, and that it should be used to solve problems.

Note. We can classify the masses and high-profile individuals:

- Bernie Sanders has high CI and low MI – he is a *dove*.
- Madeline Albright has both high CI and MI. She is an *interventionist*.
- John Bolton has high MI and low CI. He is a *hawk*.
- Ron Paul has both low CI and MI. He is an *isolationist*.

12.1.2 Public trust and critiques

There are the following three critiques that are pessimistic about the role of public opinion:

- **The realist challenge.** Realists are pessimistic about public opinion because they believe Americans are *not* realists. They believe in American exceptionalism. The public cares about values. And Americans have the desire to change the world (global meliorism).

Note. Morgenthau said "intoxication with moral abstractions" is one of the weaknesses of U.S. foreign policy.

- One solution to this issue is to make sure the public *does not* control foreign policy. Another solution is to give the public what it wants on paper but in practice, to do something different.

We coat realist policies with idealist moral rhetoric.

Example 12.2. Executives can tell the public we are fighting a war to spread American value; but in fact we fight the war to acquire natural resources.

- **The ignorance challenge.** Foreign policy tends to occur far away – these issues are far-removed from Americans' daily lives. Americans don't know enough to navigate geopolitical complexities.

Example 12.3. After Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula, the less Americans knew about Ukraine, the more they were in favor of military intervention.

There are three solutions to this challenge:

- **Top-down.** The idea of heuristics and cue-taking. People often defer to trusted political elites and other trusted individuals to help make decisions. Parties as an institution that helps people vote along their parties (Aldrich). Public opinion is controlled above by elites.
- **Bottom-up.** Predispositions and values. People have general predispositions about foreign policy so they will apply these general frameworks in different foreign policy circumstances and issues. This explains how certain times, the public and people have strong beliefs in the absence of elite cues.
- **Miracle of aggregation.** In aggregate, peoples' flaws average out.

Note (Law of large numbers (LLN)). In probability theory, the law of large numbers (LLN) is a theorem that describes the result of performing the same experiment a large number of times. According to the law, the average of the results obtained from a large number of trials should be close to the expected value and tends to become closer to the expected value as more trials are performed:

$$\overline{X}_n \xrightarrow{\text{a.s.}} \mu \quad \text{when } n \rightarrow \infty, \quad (1)$$

that is, $p(\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \overline{X}_n = \mu) = 1$

We will cover the *instability challenge* next class.

13 October 6th, 2022

In today's section, we recall some useful models and discuss the principal-agent problem and delegation.

13.1 Two models

Recall the following two models:

- **Unitary actor model.** This model is where we model each state as a rational agent.
- **Bureaucratic politics.** Recall that this is a more *domestic* foreign policy model where each state has many levels of bureaucracies characterized by:
 - Pulling and hauling.
 - Coalition building.
 - Marred by groupthink and logrolling.

13.2 F-35 production and the principal-agent problem

We watch a clip of a video about F-35 production. The United States military is the principal and Lockheed Martin (and other contractors and companies) are the agents tasked with building the F-35 fighter jets.

Current production is \$160B over budget and 10 years past original timeline.

The following are some problems that lead to inconsistencies or discrepancies in expectation between principal and agent:

- **Divergent incentives and interests.** Principal wants to make as many F-35s as possible, agents want to make as much money as possible.
- **Asymmetric information.** Agent has more expertise in completing the task than the principal.

This gives rise to *adverse selection*. It is hard for the principal to pick the *best* agent under divergent incentives and asymmetric information. We can attempt to solve our adverse selection problem with something like:

- **Screening.** Testing different agents pre-delegation.

Note (Strategy and drawbacks). Agents have an incentive to bid as high as possible. Let n_b be the number of units that the chosen agent bids and n_a be the number of units the agent actually produces. Let n_p be the quantity that the principal itself can produce. Let $n_a^{\max}, n_a^{\min} = 0$ be the maximum and minimum units the agent can produce. As long as $n_a \in [n_g, n_a^{\max}]$, the government will be satisfied.

There are some issues that arise **after delegation**.

This is known as *agency slack*. This is also related to *shirking*, where agents operate less efficiently than they actually can. There are other issues like moral hazards, hidden actions, and hidden information.

We can solve these two problems in the following ways:

- **Monitoring.** Monitor for performance intermittently.
- **Punishment.** Withholding incentives, incentivizing quick action.

Note. These solutions (monitoring, punishment) are *very costly* to the principal. This reduces the benefit to the principal from outsourcing. It is hard to know *ex ante* how much to spend on monitoring and punishment.

Agent performance may not improve at a satisfactory degree.

Note (Law, politics, counterfactual challenge). This is another case of the difference between law and politics. There is a regulatory statute that governs how this process is supposed to go; yet it does not due to structural factors and task complexity.

Moreover, it demonstrates the counterfactual challenge where we do not know how things may have been different.

13.3 Avant

Avant is concerned with military-civilian relationships: Does the military hamstring civilian control?

Avant concludes that the answer is negative. Avant focuses on a situation with *multiple* principals. Division among the civilian principals allows for increased space for military to act on their own interests. Multiple principals with divided incentives may lead the military to have more conservative preferences.

13.4 Saunders (2017)

Saunders is concerned with the way leadership experience influences advisor selection and foreign policy.

She concludes that more experienced leaders tend to have:

- **Better monitoring.** Asymmetric information is reduced.
- **Less delegation.** This allows agents to pursue their own interests.

Note. More experienced advisors also create structures where advisors need to acquire more information in a more substantial way.

- **More diverse advisors.** More experienced principal is better able to screen agents.

If the principal is more knowledgeable and experienced, monitoring is low-cost and adverse selection is reduced. This is intuition.

13.5 Rovner

Rovner is concerned with the conditions of politicization of intelligence agencies. Three hypotheses that lead to increased politicization:

- **Personal proximity.** Physical and personal relationships between agents and policymakers.
- **Organizational proximity.** Defense intelligence agency is embedded in Pentagon and is too close to policymakers.
- **Organizational dependence.** Organizations are dependent on White House.
- **Policy oversell.** Policymakers want to sell a policy and need the intelligence to support their ideas.

14 October 12th, 2022

Today, we will finish our discussion from last class and talk about the *instability challenge* to public trust.

14.0.1 Public trust and critiques redux

The last critique that is pessimistic about the role of public opinion:

- **The instability challenge.** Public support will change a lot with each new bit of information. The less knowledge the public has, the less stability opinions carry. It is hard for a leader to know what an oscillating public wants and it becomes hard to sway the public after *rallying around the flag*.

There are two solutions to this challenge. We note that solutions to this particular challenge involve changing perspective:

- **Rational adjustment.** It is a *feature*, not a *bug* that the public that opinions update with new facts. It is, in fact, rational for the public to change their opinion.
- **Measurement error.** Polling data can be incorrect due to polling errors; peoples' opinions may not actually vary that much with new information.

14.1 The media

The public is an important tool in the game. The president and Congress can check each other, the president and the bureaucracies can check each other, but all kinds of influence require public support.

One important requirement for the public to act as players in the game is *information*.

There are dual effects of information:

- **Mainstream effects.** A more educated public has more mainstream opinions. For example, Kertzer found that the more educated someone is, the less isolationist they are.
- **Polarization effects.** Selective information can push individuals further to the ends of the political spectrum.

Moreover, the media is important because this is the mechanism by which Americans consumer information. For most Americans, this is how we learn about foreign policy.

14.1.1 Media effects

There are three media effects:

- **Framing.** How the media talks about an issue; how the media gives context to certain events gives events meaning. The media tends to cover stories by covering individual victims or broader strokes in American politics or society.
- **Priming.** A consequence of agenda-setting. The information that the media covers becomes a metric or tool by which the public measures their political leaders.

Example 14.1. Global pandemic coverage, withdrawal from Afghanistan is how we measured Trump, Biden.

- **Agenda-setting.** The media chooses what to cover. By making these choices, the media ends up determining what is salient in public discourse.

14.1.2 Modeling the media

There are some different ways of thinking about the media.

- **Conveyor belt.** Events occur in the world and the media reports on it.
- **Manufactured consent models.** There are political elites who tell the media what to cover, and the media sways public opinion (Herman and Chomsky 1988).
- **Market-based models.** The idea is that the media wants clicks.

Consider the following arguments by Baum and Groeling:

- The media will cover what the public wants. The media likes conflict and novelty.
- There is also some **selective exposure**, which is related to confirmation bias. The media is partisan, creates their audience by criticizing opponents.
- There is some **elasticity of reality**. The set of acceptable events that the public will accept, depends on the difference between what elites say and the ground truth.
- **Fake news.**
- **Social media** changes our beliefs through a kind of network effect – people lean towards their friends' political views and interests.

15 October 13th, 2022

Exam is next Wednesday, October 19th. Kevin's OH will be on Monday from 12:00 PM - 2:00 PM in CGIS Knafl Cafè. There will be section after the exam on Thursday, October 20th.

Reminder to do your reading responses.

15.1 Review and application

Today, we will go over all the readings in the following groups:

- Kertzer et al. and Mutz et al.
- Thrall and Goepfner and the public opinion lecture
- Baum and Groeling
- Peksen et al. and the media lecture

and discuss the following examples.

Example 15.1 (The New York Times 2002). We consider the front page of a [2002 New York Times article](#) that covers terrorism and Iraq.

- **Peksen et al.** This is *agenda setting*. Peksen argues that media coverage of human rights abuses abroad generates public opinion to demand action on the human rights abuse.

There is also an article titled "Feeling Secure, U.S. Failed to Grasp bin Laden Threat." This is an example of the downstream consequence of *priming*, where we use salient issues as a metric by which we measure our elected officials.

By putting Iraq on the bottom of the page and framing the war as an American duty, the article *frames* Iraq in terms of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

- **Baum and Groeling.** Media likes attention. We note that Powell supporting Bush is a headline, but if Powell came out *against* Bush, there would be a larger headline because this is a larger signal.

Example 15.2 (Gallup article 2003). We consider a [2003 Gallup article](#) about war opposition.

- **Kertzer et al.** Conservatives view international environment as more hostile than liberals. We see that conservatives more strongly support the war.
- **Mutz et al.** Mutz et al. shows that minority groups tend to support trading with other non-white countries. This is a political economy idea – Mutz says that these cannot be taken account for due to economic factors. In this Gallup article, we see that blacks are more highly opposed to the war than their white counterparts. This is because Iraq is a brown country. This is an in-group out-group dynamic.
- **Thrall and Goepfner.** There is a generational split in supporting the war. 73% of people aged 65 years and older support the war whereas 66% of people aged 18-29 support the war. This is due to effects from previous wars.

Example 15.3 (Gallup article 2006). We consider a [2006 Gallup article](#) about weapons of mass destruction.

- **Kertzer et al.** Costly signaling is important. Because no weapons of mass destruction were found, the signal was less costly so fewer people believed that Iraq possessed these weapons. Related to *motivated skepticism* where people will defend their priors in light of new facts.
- **Baum and Groeling.** Related to elasticity of reality. The media seeks conflict and seeks narratives that oppose the government.

16 October 16th, 2022

This will be a summary/notes of readings for the second exam. This unit is focused on the sources of U.S. foreign policy, i.e. what causes and influences foreign policy.

16.1 President and Congress

One source is the president and Congress. Foreign policy is defined by the different powers and relationships between these two branches of government.

16.1.1 Lindsay (2003)

When there are public threats, Congress will more likely defer to the president.

"Simply put, times of peace and presidential missteps favor congressional defiance. Times of war and presidential success favor congressional deference."

- Uses congressional defiance under Clinton and congressional deference under Bush (in the context of September 11th) to show that it is the existence of external and existential threats to America that determine defiance or deference.
- When country is secure, people favor congressional debate and advocacy. When country faces threats, they prefer a strong executive and president. Congress does the same as their constituents.

16.1.2 Howell and Pevehouse (2007)

Cooperation occurs when the president is the same party as the majorities in each chamber of Congress.

"Good old-fashioned partisan politics has been, and continues to be, at play."

- Bush administration's Iraq policy received favorable hearing

16.1.3 Saunders (2011)

"That leaders vary systematically in how they perceive threats, and that these different threat perceptions help explain when and how states intervene."

- Many great-power military interventions are "wars of choice."

16.2 Bureaucratic politics

In each branch of government, there exist different agencies and bureaucracies who have their own foreign policy interests and agendas. This relationship and competition between the executive (a principal) and their advisors and agencies, between different agencies, is another component of our foreign policy.

16.2.1 Marsh (2013)

Applies bureaucratic framework to Obama's Afghan surge.

- **Rational actor model (model I).** This model sees the government as a *unitary agent*, choosing a response to the strategic problem the country faces. The government thus sets strategic goals based on national interests, evaluates options, looks at consequences, and chooses the option that leads to the best possible outcome.

- **Organizational process model (model II).** Placed particular importance on role and influence of organizational mission on foreign policy-making.
- **Bureaucratic politics model (model III).** Actors are expected to favor policy options that fulfill their bureaucratic role and augment their power and influence in foreign policy decision making process. Policy positions determined by their position within government and bureaucratic role.
 - **Miles's Law.** Where you stand depends on where you sit.

Government actions are political and not product of cost-benefit analyses. Political competition is crucial. Government decisions are a result of ***pulling and hauling*** between bureaucracies and agencies. There are two types:

- **Horizontal.** Occurs horizontally along the same level of bureaucracy.
- **Vertical.** Occurs vertically along the chain of command.

Pulling and hauling is composed of:

- **Coalition building.** Actors divide into coalitions to pursue policy preferences. Maximize individual bargaining advantages in decision games.
- **Logrolling.** Actors exchange favors or promises to secure support for a policy.
- **Final decision as compromise.** Kind of a consequence of pulling and hauling — final decisions come as a compromise of all interested parties.
- **Bargaining advantages.** Refers to control of implementation, over information that allows people to assess the problem, persuasiveness with other players, and ability to affect other players' objectives.

Government action is taken through ***action channels*** — regularized sets of procedures for producing government action. Can be formal like National Security Council (NSC) meetings; or informal when *ad hoc* participants or procedures are employed in the decision making process.

Note. Bargaining advantages are activated through action channels, which provide the forum for government action and decision in foreign policy.

16.2.2 Avant (1996)

Avant is concerned with military-civilian relationships: Does the military hamstring civilian control?

- Avant concludes that the answer is negative. Avant focuses on a situation with multiple principals (president and Congress).
- Division among the civilian principals' preferences allows for increased space for military to act on their own interests. Agents can act strategically to play principals to gain support over agents' own preferences.
- Multiple principals with divided incentives may lead the military to have more conservative preferences. Increase in policy disagreement among principals should cause principals to delegate more authority over scope of policy, but require increasingly confining procedures (standards, hearings, restrictions, etc.), ensuring control over organizational behavior.

Introduces the **principal-agent model**. When a *principal* delegates a task to an *agent*, we have the following problems:

- **Incentive alignment.** Principal and agent may not have the same incentives.

- **Hidden action problems and information.** Due to *asymmetric information* inherent between principal and agent Specialized agent can have more information of a task than the principal.

Hidden action problems make it harder for employer to know if employee is doing the following:

- **Shirking.** Agents operate less efficiently than they actually can.

Note. Actions to overcome this problem can lead to **moral hazard** — refers to action by agent to satisfy the indicator of his behavior that principal monitors. The indicator is never a true proxy, satisfying indicator produces less than optimal results.

Hidden information leads to:

- **Adverse selection.** Where agent misrepresents qualities to principal, causing principal to hire someone of lower quality than they prefer.

Thus principals need to think hard about how to select appropriate agents and monitor them to fulfill principal preferences.

16.2.3 Rovner (2011)

Rovner is concerned with the conditions of politicization of intelligence agencies. Three traditional hypotheses that lead to increased politicization:

- **Personal proximity.** Politicization increases when intelligence officials interact closely with policy-makers.
 - If they maintain professional working distance, they are less likely to face the kind of policy pressures that lead to biased estimates.
 - Intelligence fails to remain objective.
- **Organizational proximity.** Politicization is unlikely when intelligence agencies are too close to the policy process. Based on *bureaucratic design*.
 - Leaders more likely to politicize agencies that are bureaucratically intermingled with policy-making bodies.
- **Organizational dependence.** Leaders are able to manipulate intelligence by holding bureaucratic incentives of intelligence at risk.
 - Bureaucracies seek wealth, autonomy, and prestige. Institutional interests color their advice to policymakers.
 - If agencies rely on policy-makers to achieve goals, they are vulnerable to manipulation.
- **Policy oversell.** Politicization based on domestic politics.
 - Domestic political pressures create incentives for policy-makers to oversell the amount and quality of security threats, regardless of nature of personal relationships or organizational design.
 - Policy-makers create domestic support for controversial decisions by making it seem like there is consensus in intelligence community.

16.2.4 Saunders (2017)

Saunders is concerned with the way leadership experience influences advisor selection and foreign policy. She concludes that more experienced leaders do the following:

- **Experience as a monitoring device.** Asymmetric information is reduced.

- Experienced principals are better able to undertake direct monitoring that evaluates work of agents due to high knowledge.
- Better indirect/implicit monitoring. Accountability is better enforced, attenuates overconfidence under certain conditions.

- **Delegation and information acquisition.** Delegation helps busy principals draw on expertise and information of agents. Experienced leaders may be at information disadvantage but has greater ability to detect low-quality proposals and assimilate new information.

Note. *Bureaucratic drift* occurs when policies that diverge from principal's preferences.

- **Diversity in decision making.** Inexperienced leaders are more politically beholden to their experienced advisors. Such advisors will be empowered, giving them disproportionate voice.

An experienced leader is more likely to keep experienced conflicting opinions in their group of advisors

	Mechanism		
	Monitoring	Delegation	Diversity
Principal-agent issue	Moral hazard. (In)experienced principals are (less) more able to explicitly and implicitly monitor experienced agents.	Information acquisition. (In)experienced principals are (more) less able to credibly delegate to experienced agents.	Adverse selection. (In)experienced principals are (less) more able to take advantage of a diversity of views or discrepant information.
Examples of biases magnified / diminished	Overconfidence	Overconfidence; availability heuristic	Homogeneity of views; ambiguity aversion
Effect on decision making	Inexperienced principals lead to riskier behavior	Inexperienced principals lead to incomplete or reduced information acquisition; riskier behavior	Inexperienced principals lead to lack of de-biasing through credibly voiced alternative perspective; choices framed as more certain

Table 1: How (in)experienced principals affect experienced agents.

16.3 Public opinion

We examine the role of the public in determining public policy. The public imposes additional constraints on the branches of government *and* bureaucracies discussed above. It is the public that judges executives and legislators in power.

16.3.1 Kertzer et al. (2020)

Kertzer et al. examine their theory of signaling in the context of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran. They find patterns that are consistent with *motivated skepticism*: individuals most likely to update their beliefs are those who need reassurance the least; *cost signals* cause polarization rather than convergence.

Important ideas:

- **Costly signals.** Whether a signal is costly or not is inherent in the signal, not to those interpreting. The point is that they help differentiate between two different potential states of the world — little room for interpretation.
- **Motivated skepticism.** People tend to display bias in evaluating political arguments and evidence, favoring those that reinforce their existing views and disparaging those that contradict their views. Updating priors with new events is asymmetric.

Note. This is essentially disconfirmation bias.

- **Selective attention.** People are more likely to seek information that confirms their priors.

We traditionally measure foreign policy beliefs along two axes:

- **Cooperative internationalism (CI).** Orientation towards international affairs that stresses concern for others abroad. Global solidarity; support for international institution.
Want to work with other countries to solve global problems.
- **Militant internationalism (MI).** Marks ubiquitous division between hawks and doves over importance, effectiveness, and desirability of using coercion or force to reach foreign policy objectives.

16.3.2 Thrall and Goeppner (2015)

This piece is a descriptive look at millennials' attitudes towards foreign policy. They find that

- Millennials perceive the world as significantly less dangerous than their elders; foreign policy issues are less urgent.
- Millennials are more supportive of international cooperation than previous generations.
- Due to Iraq and Afghanistan, millennials are less supportive of the use of military force.

Important ideas:

- **Cohort effects.** Different effects that lead successive cohorts to hold different attitudes from previous ones:
 - Unique historical context into which each cohort is born.
 - Major events that they experience as young adults.

These *cohort effects* are most powerful during the *critical period* of young adulthood.

Thrall and Goeppner also categorize people along the *four faces of internationalism* (Wittkopf) along cooperative and militant internationalism:

- Bernie Sanders has high CI and low MI – he is a *dove*.
- Madeline Albright has both high CI and MI. She is an *interventionist*.
- John Bolton has high MI and low CI. He is a *hawk*.
- Ron Paul has both low CI and MI. He is an *isolationist*.

16.3.3 Mutz et al. (2021)

Mutz et al. shows that minority groups tend to support trading with other non-white countries. This is a political economy idea — Mutz says that these cannot be taken account for due to economic factors.

White individuals have become less supportive of trade than minorities and that whites are more likely than minorities to favor trade with highly similar countries. We suggest that minority support for trade is due to four well-documented differences in the psychological predispositions of whites and minorities in the United States:

- Minorities have lower levels of racial prejudice.
- Minorities are lower in social dominance.
- Minorities express less nationalism than whites.
- There is evidence of rising ingroup racial consciousness among whites.

16.4 The media

Here, we discuss the different ways the media influences the public, who then impose their costs and constraints on the many different stakeholders in foreign policy initiatives.

16.4.1 Baum and Groeling (2010)

Baum and Groeling propose a theory about the roles of the public, political elites, and the media.

The media will cover whatever the public wants (wants to get clicks); and will praise (criticize) the corresponding party.

- **Oversampled presidential party criticism.** Presidential party criticism is more newsworthy than presidential party praise, news media will present more negative than positive evaluations of the president by his own party in the news.
- **Salient crisis novelty.** For members of Congress from both parties, ratio of presidential criticism to presidential praise selected to appear on the news will be greater during high-salience crisis periods than during other periods.
- **Media partisanship.** Left-leaning news outlets will more likely feature stories that are harmful to Republicans or helpful to Democrats, relative to opposing types of stories (and vice versa). Nonpartisan outlets equally likely to feature stories that are harmful to Democrats and Republicans.

Positive (negative) evaluations by (non)presidential party elites have the strongest effects on presidential approval among fellow partisan identifiers.

- **Partisan credibility.** Presidential evaluations by fellow partisans will more strongly influence individual's approval of the president than will evaluations by members of the other party.
- **Costly credibility.** Evaluations that impose a cost on the speaker's own party will have stronger effect on individuals' propensity to support the president than will equivalent *cheap talk* evaluations that impose no cost on the speaker's party.

They define a notion of *elasticity of reality*. This is the elites' capacity to frame events distinctly from their true events.

As the elites' informational advantage decreases over time, the influence of new information inconsistent with the (updated) prevailing media representation of reality decreases.

16.4.2 Peksen et al. (2014)

This is an application of the role of media in foreign policy. They argue that press attention to human rights violations increases the threat and imposition of sanctions by mobilizing the public to pressure leaders to take action against abusive regimes.

They discuss the following media effect:

- **Agenda setting.** The media chooses what to cover. By making these choices, the media ends up determining what is salient in public discourse.

16.5 Interest groups

The final agent in the domestic aspects of the two-level game of foreign policy.

16.5.1 Milner and Tingley (2015)

Interested in distributional politics, interest groups in terms of economic self-interest (realism). They examine foreign policy instruments.

Politics concerning foreign policy instruments depends on the extent of the instrument's distributional consequences and the extent of ideological divisions.

They find that:

- Presidents usually care more about international environment than legislators because members of Congress care mostly about reelection prospects.
 - Members of Congress tend to spend time directing domestic policy benefits to their home districts and states rather than monitoring the international environment (which is a public good).
 - Since executives receive privileged information from state agencies, they are more aware of international threats.
- Presidential power depends on the issue at hand (cannot purely judge power off of high vs low politics) because domestic political economy and national security issues are inherently related.
 - Policy instruments are not independent because of **policy substitution**. Different types of policy can be used concurrently or in place of one another to accomplish a goal.
 - **High politics.** A state's security relationship with other states in the international system.
 - **Low politics.** Societal pressures and domestic political economy.
- Focus on seven instruments: International trade, immigration policy, economic aid, geopolitical aid, sanctions, military spending, and military deployment.
- Policy instruments vary in the extent to which they have domestic distributional consequences (winners and losers from a policy) and whether these costs/benefits are concentrated or diffuse.
 - Presidents face more constraints when distribution of gains and losses is large and concentrated.
 - Interest groups should be more active on policy instruments that have greater distributional consequences.

Note. We should expect high levels of lobbying for budget/economic aid, domestic spending on military, immigration and trade (maybe some towards the executive for trade) directed towards Congress rather than the executive branch.

There should be less economic interest group activity for geopolitical aid, sanctions, and U.S. troop deployment. This lobbying is mostly targeted towards the executive branch.

16.5.2 LeoGrande (2020)

Interested in ethnic communities, thinks of ethnic groups in terms of identity categories (constructivism). LeoGrande examines the Cuban-American lobby. This lobby was one of the most powerful ethnic lobbies in the United States in the 1980s-2000s.

He finds that:

- Ethnic interest group influence stems from either characteristics of the group/community and the group's relationship to other political actors.
- Often interest groups might appear successful because they lobby for things that the government wanted to do anyways.
 - The impact of factors that are characteristics of the lobby depend on the political context (the lobby's relationship with other actors and other groups lobbying at the same time). Thus influence is interactive and not additive.

17 October 17th, 2022

Today, we discuss interest groups in foreign policy.

17.0.1 The media redux

Last class, we discussed the media in foreign policy; and in particular, market-based models. Recall that in these models, the media is giving us what they think we want.

17.1 Interest groups

Recall we have been discussing the domestic aspects of the two-level game of foreign policy. We have different agents that constrain the president. Today, we discuss the final agent.

We are interested in the following questions:

- What is a special interest group?
- Why are they effective?
- The question of ethnic lobbies.

17.1.1 What is a special interest group?

Special interests are actors who engage in lobbying and contributions to shape policy. This is thinking about special interests in terms of their *actions*.

This definition emphasizes a kind of *particularism* against a *national* interest. This definition is open to arguments against this particularism.

We want to make a different kind of argument in class. When we define an interest group, we need to take a step back and define a national interest on the one hand and a special interest in the other.

Liberal theories of politics posits that there is no such thing as a *national interest*. All politics is about competition between different groups within the state, each with their own set of preferences and conception about what the national interest is.

Example 17.1. Hawks and doves have different conceptions of the national interest. Agencies involved in bureaucratic politics have different conceptions of the national interest.

The question is less about assigning normative judgement and more about trying to understand which groups win the competition and influence/drive our foreign policy.

17.1.2 Why are interest groups effective?

In different studies, we find that public opinion matters less than business interests. We want to understand how small interest groups trump individual people.

The key observation is that special interest groups overcome *collective action* problems. We have Mancur Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965):

$$a_i \equiv v_i - c \tag{2}$$

where a_i is the advantage that individual i receives from the group's interest being achieved, v_i is individual gains, and c is the cost.

Predicts interest group involvement in economic, distributive issues.

Note. This is just a utility calculation. The smaller the group, the larger v_i is. This means that as the group becomes large, individual gains decrease (a fraction of the total benefit). The smaller a group is, the more effective they are (because individual benefits increase), and they have better incentives.

Note (Milner and Tingley). Relates to Milner and Tingley reading on which foreign policy instruments are likely to feature greater lobbying of Congress.

Example 17.2 (The sugar lobby). Sugar imports are currently restricted; the cost of sugar in the U.S. is double the world price.

Note (Trade policy). Trade policy is not just driven at the industry level. There is more variation in tariff rates within industries than between them (Kim 2017).

There is industry-wide lobbying to firm-specific lobbying. Contemporary trade policy is very very specific *to individual firms*.

17.1.3 Ethnic lobbies in foreign policy

Involves thinking of the benefits of lobbying in a different way – not in terms of strictly economic benefits, but reflecting values and identities (constructivism returns!)

Example 17.3. The Israel lobby, the Cuban-American lobby (LeoGrande), the German lobby.

As the United States becomes more diverse, the conception of our national interest will drastically change.

17.1.4 Two challenges

There are two challenges that wrap up the first half of the semester.

1. **The counterfactual challenge.** The difficulty of proving that policies would be different without interest group lobbying.
2. **Objective national interest.** Is there such a thing as an objective national interest in U.S. foreign policy? Some theorists say yes, but past few weeks of class say no. If not, is it meaningful to talk about special interests if you cannot juxtapose them against a national interest?

18 October 24th, 2022

18.0.1 Logistics

Exams will be handed out on Wednesday at the end of class. There will be a curve on the exam.

The research paper topics are posted on Canvas. We can choose either a research paper or a policy paper. Policy papers are trying to explicate a particular policy that the government should pursue. Research papers are more academically-focused.

18.0.2 Semester review and looking forward

In the first half of the semester, we discussed outside-in explanations for foreign policy (realism, liberalism, constructivism) and inside-out explanations (president and Congress, bureaucratic politics, public, media, interest groups).

In the second half of the semester, we will be looking at the outputs of U.S. foreign policy. We will discuss the international order and the rise and fall of great powers: hegemony and the liberal international order, the rise of China, anti-Americanism, and NATO and alliances.

18.1 Hegemony and the international order

Political scientist Robert Gilpin posits that there are *three* types of international orders:

- **Hegemonic.** One powerful state dominates.
- **Bipolar.** Two powerful states dominate, each with their own *sphere of influence*.

Example 18.1. The United States and the Soviet Union during the World War, with spheres of influence defined by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, respectively

- **Balance of power.** Three or more powerful states dominate.

Example 18.2. The world before World War I.

Hegemonic theorists argue that hegemony happens all the time. There are notions of regional hegemons. Hegemons derive power from the following:

- **Material view.** The hegemon is the one with the military and economic supremacy.
- **Leadership and legitimacy.** The hegemon is the (legitimate) leader of the world (Gramsci). Gramsci posits that hegemons gain power when other states perceive the hegemon as the leader.

Note (Hegemony and empire). Most political scientists see the United States as a hegemon, not as an empire. This is a technical description.

We can model a hegemon in a graph where the hegemon is the center and connected periphery states. Periphery states are also connected by edges. Empires are modeled by the same graph without edges between periphery states (peripheral segmentation). This is a *rimless hub and spoke structure* (Nexon and Wright 2007).

Empire is also characterized by indirect rule, where there are quasi-parties that enforce imperial rule.

18.1.1 Hegemonic stability theory

Recall last class, we discussed Olson's collective action:

$$a_i \equiv v_i - c. \quad (3)$$

There exist different types of goods in economic theory. We can provide a typology of goods along two dimensions: excludability and rivalry.

Excludability is defined as the degree to which a good can be limited to only paying customers, or conversely, the degree to which a supplier, producer or other managing body can prevent "free" consumption of a good. A good is *rivalrous* or if its consumption by one consumer prevents simultaneous consumption by other consumers.

	Excludable	Non-excludable
Subtractable	Private good	Common pool resource (CPR)
Non-subtractable	Club good	Public good

Table 2: Goods typology in economic theory.

We note that an international order is a *public good* (Kindleberger). Kindleberger suggests that:

- International order is usually created by a single dominant power.
- Maintaining order requires continuing hegemony.

We note that if $a_i > 0$ for any party in Olson's equation, then the group is *privileged*.

Definition 18.3 (Privileged group). A group is *privileged* if there is one member of a group who derives enough advantage from the good that they are willing to provide it for themselves.

There are three key implications from hegemonic stability theory:

- The United States is an indispensable nation. American hegemony is in everyone's interest. Under United States leadership, parts of the world have turned from jungle to garden.
- Hegemonic decline leads to instability.
- American hegemony is uniquely benevolent. This argues that the rules that the United States institutionalized reflected the liberalism of the United States.

Note. Great powers have had opportunities to reshape the world order after critical junctures. (Peace of Westphalia, Treaty of Utrecht, Congress of Vienna, Treaty of Versailles, end of World War II).

At these junctures, great powers can dominate (Soviet Union after World War II), abandon (U.S. after World War I), or institutionalize (U.S. after World War II).

Post-World War II, the United States instituted a rule-based liberal international order (United Nations system, open markets, self-determination, financial stability). Fazal discusses a norm of territorial integrity.

18.1.2 Challenges to liberal internationalism

President Donald J. Trump posed a challenge to liberal internationalism. There are two questions to consider:

- As the United States turns inward, what happens to the international system? Rising powers in the international system (BRICS) are not democratic or liberal powers.
- If the United States declines, what will the next international order look like? What does a Chinese-led international order look like? What principles would they emphasize?

19 October 26th, 2022

Today is a lecture by Professor Meg Rithmire. We will discuss China's rise and insecurity of interdependence.

19.1 China's economic re-emergence

Industrialiation occurred under state-directed economy and politics. This was experimental and gradual.

19.1.1 Deng Xiaoping

Deng's strategy was "crossing the river while grasping for stones," constituted the following:

- **Reform (gai3 ge2).** Includes return to household farming, migration, SOE reform, and rural industrialization (TVEs).
- **Opening (kai1 fang1).** Constitutes FDI, trade liberalization, and coastal open policy.

19.1.2 Periodizing reforms

- **Liminality and neglect (1978-1989).**
 - Agricultural experimentation.
 - Creative coporate forms (TVEs).
 - Capital hunger.
- **Opening to foreign capital (1992-2001).**
 - Southern tour reignites direction of reforms.
 - Round tripping direct foreign investment (FDI), sent capital to Hong Kong and then back to China.
 - Asian financial crisis showed China how deeply problematic deeply financialized markets could be.
- **World's factory (2001-2006).**
 - Massive FDI, middle market competition.
 - Macroeconomic imbalances including high investment, high savings, low consumption, dollar accumulation, sterilization, capital controls.
 - Difference from Japan and South Korea. There was not much FDI, not big enough market, only exports.
 - Good enough product for good enough markets.
- **Shift in Chinese model (late 2000s-present).** This marked the end of domestic institutional mechanisms to facilitate WTO accession (Tan 2021).
 - Global financial crises, economic distortions.
 - Rise of domestic contest over China's future (Chongqing model).
 - Sense of threat from corruption, external events, domestic instability.
 - Fear of reliance on global supply chains, especially for critical inputs.
 - Party-state capitalism. CCP monopoly on political power as the abiding focus, characterized by expansion of party-state's presence in firms, expansion of party cells and state minority shareholding (Chen and Rithmire 2020).

Result is a threat mentality and securitization of China's economy, political imperative shifts from growth and global competition to regime survival.

The blurred boundary between the state and firms contributes to the security dilemma. Domestic actions in regimes of global significance hold security implications for other states. Economic relations are sites of insecurity and security dilemmas because firms can be security resources (capabilities).

19.1.3 China and the liberal international order

China prefers openness and liberalism economically — interdependence on global supply chains.

There exists American/OECD backlash against China and Chinese firms (and the Chinese model that promotes closedness). There is heightened scrutiny of FDI, punitive efforts against large Chinese firms; the creation of novel institutions to manage perceived security threats posed by Chinese firms. Moreover, OECD countries that are shutting down trade and liberalism.

Example 19.1 (United States backlash). CHIPS and Science Act, outbound reviews, economic coercion.

Note. China did not converge to our model. Instead, we are converging to the Chinese model, like Made in China 2025.

19.1.4 Conclusions

There are new security studies about firms and economic capabilities: reshaping supply chains, financial networks to contour economic coercive power. We see how analog Ukraine war is. People say this is exactly what we need to do to China. Most of the war is set in Trade and Commerce, shutting Russia, China, and Iran out of global financial systems.

Note (China and Taiwan). Ukraine is cautionary tale for China. China is not as capable as Russia of being autarkic.

President Xi Jinping is more depressed with Chinese politics, Xi stopped talking about the peaceful rise. Because of open institutions, Xi may not know amphibious assault is going to happen. U.S. national security efforts make it a decisive decade for China.

The US told Chinese intelligence officials that Putin was going for Kiev when Putin only told him about eastern provinces. Intelligence officials did not tell Xi.

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is not a debt trap. It might be for China. China works by campaigns. One Child Policy. Zero Covid policy. Eliminate poverty by 2020. Everyone feeds propaganda. Local officials then implement. Can be innovative and can be very abusive. Everything China does is a premeditated plan.

There is also the idea of a two-level game. Backlash to Chinese FDI, semiconductors and chips would have happened with or without Trump. Xi was initially seen as a liberal, a reformer, attacking corruption before liberalizing. Party-state capitalism will probably happen without Xi.

A final note is that the American strategy of "stopping China" is necessary but promotes a zero-sum game and dangerous outcomes.

20 October 27th, 2022

Exams are handed back! We will go over essay logistics and survey responses.

There are many things that have gone well in section. Some things to change: Kevin will provide reading recaps at the end of lectures and provide more overviews of readings and core ideas.

Today, we will discuss liberal hegemonic structure.

20.0.1 Public goods redux

Recall that collective action problems are ones of coordination. People tend to not contribute to public goods because of free-riding, i.e. tragedy of the commons.

We recall Olson's model:

$$a_i \equiv v_i - c \quad (4)$$

where a_i is the advantage that individual i receives from the group's interest being achieved, v_i is individual gains, and c is the cost.

20.1 Hegemony and liberal international order

The international order is a public good. The international system is a *privileged group*. A privileged group contains at least one individual that benefits more from a public good than its production costs. Therefore, the good will be produced although other members of the group benefit without paying.

In this case, a dominant global power, a *hegemon* is a privileged agent who has a greater interest in maintaining the global international order and system. For this actor, the benefit is so large that they are willing to bear most or all the cost.

This is the essence of *hegemony stability theory*, where there exists a central power with global interests that maintain a world order. This dominant power provides international goods and coordination. Decline of a hegemonic power is associated with instability.

Note. Robert Keohane's book *After Hegemony* offers a liberal institutionalist counterargument to this idea of hegemony-induced coordination.

Example 20.1 (The Marshall Plan). The Marshall Plan is an example of hegemonic stability theory. The argument to maintain and promote free institutions globally, to promote economic growth, is promoted in American self-interest.

20.2 Readings

- **Charles P. Kindleberger.** A hegemonic stability theorist who is in favor of the Marshall Plan because this is hegemonic leadership (on the part of the United States) that provides public goods like economic order and stability. He also spends time talking about the decline of the United States due to the rise of Japan, etc.

Note. There is a distinction between dominance and leadership. Dominance happens when a country with more power dictates terms to countries with less power, without considering the latter's interests. Leadership happens when the dominant power makes countries with less power do things that are against their short-term interest, but the less powerful state can pursue long-term interests.

- **Tanisha M. Fazal.** Compliance of state borders has been generally observed. Norm of territorial conquest exists; the hegemon needs to buy into the norm to create a norm.

21 October 31st, 2022

Last week, we discussed hegemonic stability theory. Today, we discuss the rise of China.

21.1 The rise of China

We first look at *power cycle theory*, which studies the cyclic rise and fall of great powers. This begs the question of when United States unipolarity ends.

Professor Rithmire discussed China from an economic perspective. Today, we will discuss the rise of China on the security dimension.

Note. China did not have a seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) until 1971. President Nixon wanted closer relations with China to weaken the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It is now the largest economy in the world.

We will discuss two central questions.

21.1.1 Is China changing global polarity

We are concerned with a change from unipolarity to something else. Most political scientists talk about a new unipolar world. People tend to talk about a multipolar world; Chinese analysts discuss a balance of power with the United States.

China is rising economically and behaving more aggressively in territorial disputes: Diaoyu/Senkaku islands (Japan), Paracel islands (Vietnam), Spratly islands (Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines). This is about global signaling and natural resources (mainly natural gas).

China wants to change its image with its neighbors, promoting a "peaceful rise," by connecting with other countries using public diplomacy: promoting Chinese universities, improving CCTV, etc.

21.1.2 Implications of China's rise for the United States

The United States pays close attention to China, perceiving China as the decisive threat to the United States. Kertzer suggests that this is because there is a risk of hegemonic war.

There are two mechanisms:

- **Preventive war.** The hegemon preemptively attacks the rising power to prevent its rise.
- **Revisionist war.** Rising power decides the status quo is not in its interest. Distinction between revisionist state or status quo state.

There is a division between balance of power realists and hegemonic theorists.

Balance of power theorists	Hegemonic theorists
Stability comes from a <i>balance</i> of power	Stability comes from an <i>imbalance</i> of power
An established hegemon is inherently threatening	An established hegemon is inherently <i>not</i> threatening
A rising power is inherently threatening	A rising power is threatening if it is dissatisfied with the status quo

Table 3: Division between balance of power realists and hegemonic realists.

Assessing China's motivations is difficult. We cannot think about from another person's perspective. This is the *problem of other minds*, even if we know what someone does, we do not know *why* they did it.

Richard Cottam provides a *motivational taxonomy*. There are five families of explanations that explain a state's motives:

- **Economic.** Population, loot, trade, foreign or domestic investment.
- **Communal.** Grandeur, participant excitement, frontier dynamics.
- **Messianic.** Religious, cultural ideological.
- **Governmental.** Bureaucratic vested interests, military vested interests, personal power.
- **Defense.** State security.

Note (Danger of embedded images). Once you have a well-defined image of another state (as an enemy, ally, colony, etc.), these images become *sticky*; all new information will be interpreted in conformation with this image.

22 November 2nd, 2022

22.0.1 Hegemony redux

Recall last class, we discussed the rise of China and hegemonic war. We discussed hegemonic transition theory where one hegemon declines in relation to a rising state.

There are two types of transitions and *risks of hegemonic war*:

- **Preventative war.** The falling hegemon engages in war as they decline in an effort to maintain power.
- **Status quo v. revisionist.** The rising power decides to attack the hegemon to rewrite the global world order.

Moreover, we discussed hegemonic stability theory, where the international order is seen as a public good (Kindleberger). There are the following implications:

- International order is usually created by a single dominant power. This is the United States hegemon today; maintains the liberal international order.
- American hegemony is uniquely benevolent.

Note (Benevolent liberal international order). The data show that many countries view the United States neutrally or negatively. It is clear that America does not seem to be viewed as benevolent.

22.1 Anti-Americanism

Definition 22.1 (Anti-Americanism). A bias or prejudice against the United States that takes multiple forms.

Note. There is a difference between bias and opinion. Moreover, there is some multidimensionality — not all forms of anti-Americanism are the same. For example, the elitist anti-Americanism in Europe is not the same as the *radical* anti-Americanism in Indonesia, for example.

We will discuss three theories of where anti-Americanism comes from.

22.1.1 Liberal theories

This is an argument about American values. Liberal theories of anti-Americanism posits that people hate the United States because of what the United States represents — democracy and freedom.

The United States is a bastion of liberal values, consumerism, capitalism, and people around the world dislike these values.

Note. This does not conform to data; many states' opinions on America have shifted significantly over the last twenty years. Liberal theories do not explain this discrepancy.

22.1.2 Realist theories I

This is an argument about what America actually is.

Realist theories of anti-Americanism posits that perhaps there is no such thing as a benevolent hegemon. The United States enforces its use of unrestrained power. This use of liberal power tells other states that there they cannot restrain the hegemon and they fear what comes next.

Note. Recall *internal* and *external* balancing. These are examples of *hard balancing*, where states are balancing hard power. There is a notion of *soft balancing*. America has hard and soft power dominance.

States may jump on the bandwagon; that because it is hard to restrain the United States via hard balancing, states may follow the United States or engage in *soft balancing*.

Definition 22.2 (Soft balancing). *Soft balancing* occurs when states use non-military tools to make it harder for a hegemon to do what it wants. This is a *reaction* to American hegemony

22.1.3 Realist theories II

This is an argument about what America does.

This theory connects anti-Americanism to American policies themselves.

Note. There is some data showing that a majority civilians in only three countries (Nigeria, India, the United States) believed that the removal of Saddam Hussein created a more safe world.

This may be evidence of *motivated reasoning/skepticism*.

Note. There is also large president-dependence. This variation in opinion suggests that anti-Americanism may be tied to American foreign policy. A change in government does not correspond to new (perceived) values or a change in power.

Recall that hegemonic stability theory says that everyone loves the United States and that other states are afraid to challenge the United States.

Anti-Americanism makes it hard for the United States to do what it seeks to do on the world stage. We can think about cooperation between states as a two level game. For example, if a head of state *A* is sympathetic to the United States but their public is not. This influences decision making and cooperation between the United States and state *A*.

22.1.4 Public diplomacy

To combat anti-Americanism, America engages in public diplomacy. In addition to convincing foreign leaders that cooperation is in their public interest, the United States instead tries to convince foreign publics that it is in their interest to support the United States.

For public opinion-sensitive leaders and governments, this can convince foreign officials to cooperate with the United States.

Example 22.3. President Obama's Nowruz greeting.

There is also *disaster diplomacy*. These are humanitarian and civic-assistance deployments (Flynn, Machain, Stoyan 2019).

23 November 3rd, 2022

Today, we discuss the rise of China and Rithmire guest lecture.

23.1 Hegemonic rise

23.1.1 Polarity

Recall a graph where we have power over time, the logarithmic rise of the rising power and the logarithmic decay of the hegemon.

We discuss the following systems:

- **Unipolar.** One dominant global superpower (a hegemon).
- **Bipolar.** Two dominant powers. Think U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.
- **Multipolar.** Many competing powers. Consider western Europe pre-World War I.

23.1.2 Power transition theory

There is potential for conflict between a rising power and a declining hegemon. They can arise in the following ways:

- **Preventative war.** This kind of war is initiated by the hegemon before the rising power surpasses it in power.
- **Revisionist or status quo.** The *revisionist* rising power seeks to change the world order and engages in conflict with the hegemon. This kind of conflict does not necessarily occur after a rising state gains more power than a hegemon.

23.1.3 United States and China (Friedberg 2005)

We want to specify how we are measuring power, and how this "power" varies over time. We want to know this because this can drastically change when conflict may occur. We also want to know our units of time.

We will discuss Friedberg's 2005 article. He discusses optimism and pessimism in all three theories: realist, liberalism, and constructivism.

• Realism.

- Optimists claim that China's power is not increasing as rapidly as is often claimed, it has modest/conservative ambitions, and there are a variety of factors that will mitigate the effects of a security dilemma. China has no modern history of extensive territorial conquest nor visible desire to expand; Asia will be bipolar and this, although tense, will be stable; U.S. is a naval power and China is a land power.
- Pessimists believe that China's rising power, expanding aims, and the intense security dilemma will lead to conflict between it and the United States. Throughout history, rising powers, which tended to have expanding interests, were troublemakers as they challenged territorial boundaries, international institutional arrangements, and hierarchies of prestige.

• Liberalism.

- Optimists believe in the pacifying power of economic interdependence, international institutions, and democratization. They believe that the process of democratization is already under way in China and is driven largely by economic development and openness to trade (Kantian tripod).

- Pessimists believe that China is an authoritarian regime with an uncertain grip on power, amid a transition to democracy. Nations are most likely to initiate conflict with their neighbors when they are in transition from authoritarianism towards democracy.

- **Constructivism.**

- Optimists because they believe in the possibility that people can change the world by changing how they think. They believe that China's repeated interactions with the international community will lead to shifts in its strategic culture, in the norms of international behavior accepted by its leaders, and their conception of national identity.
- Pessimists believe that repeated interactions might not necessarily alter existing mental constructs, but rather reinforce them.

24 November 7th, 2022

Recall last class, we discussed anti-Americanism and public diplomacy. Today, we discuss NATO and alliance politics.

24.1 NATO and alliances

Definition 24.1 (Alliances). Alliances are formal associations of states for the use/non-use of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership (Snyder 1997).

These are not the same as coalitions or our colloquial understanding of alliances.

Coalitions can form on an *ad hoc* basis and can disperse instantaneously. Today, we discuss exclusively alliances that have military or security provisions and agreements.

Note. There are different types of alliances:

- **Defensive.** NATO, Warsaw Pact during the Cold War.
- **Offensive.** Germany and Soviet Union against Poland in World War II.
- **Neutrality pacts.** 1935 France agrees to be neutral if Italy attacks Ethiopia, but not other states.

We note that alliance pacts are specific.

24.1.1 America's allies

Chronologically, we have the following:

- **Rio Treaty (1947).** This is an inter-American treaty between the United States and South American states. It establishes "hemispheric defense," a collective defense pact. We note that Mexico and Canada are not (currently) members, while Argentina is a member.
The U.S. wanted to keep other great powers out of Latin America (particularly the Soviets). The U.S. provided economic and military aid; in exchange, the U.S. gets a collective defense agreement.
- **NATO (1949).** This is based off of the Rio Treaty; collective defense. This includes the United States, Canada, and the western European countries.
Collective containment and defense against the Soviet Union.
- **ANZUS (1951).** This is a pact between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.
- **Philippine Treaty (1951).** Mutual defense treaty between the United States and the Philippines. There are currently 174 U.S. Marines stationed in the Philippines.
- **Republic of Korea Treaty (1953).** Mutual defense treaty between South Korea and the United States. There are currently about 30,000 troops stationed in South Korea, mostly U.S. Army and Air Force.
- **Southeast Asia Treaty (SEATO) (1954).** Member nations include the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, etc.
SEATO was dissolved in the 1970s.
- **Japanese Treaty (1960).** Treaty of mutual cooperation and defense between the United States and Japan. There are currently about 62,000 troops stationed in Japan.

Note. There are no *formal* U.S. alliances in the Middle East or Africa. There is also nothing in the Asian subcontinent.

We also see that there may be power asymmetries between the United States and Allies.

It is also interesting to note that there is regional homogeneity. In the western hemisphere, we observe multilateral alliances but in Asia, there is a set of bilateral alliances.

It is also interesting how some alliances exist and others have dissolved (SEATO). In particular, we are interested in why did NATO persist after the Berlin wall fell.

24.1.2 Alliance maintenance

There are patrons and proteges in asymmetric alliances, a stronger actor and a weaker actor.

The patron is concerned about the following:

- **Entrapment.** The protege may seek to engage in conflicts. In this case, the patron will be forced to engage in the conflict.

This is related to *emboldenment*, where the protege may feel emboldened to more intransigent towards adversaries. There is also a notion of *chain-ganging* as a potential consequence of the emboldenment (especially in World War I) – smaller powers dragged their larger patrons into a global war.

- **Independence.** Patron is worried about losing alliance if the protege becomes independent. Patrons seek to expand influence.
- **Free-riding.** The protege is not providing their share in the alliance. There is tension between free-riding and independence.

The protege's concerns include:

- **Abandonment.** Relates to patron concerns about independence and emboldenment. Incentivizes proteges to perhaps seek independence and emboldenment.

This is the alliance dilemma. Patrons want to support proteges but don't want to give resources entirely to protege. Finding this balance is the alliance dilemma.

Note. The solution may be some notion of reassurance. The idea is that patrons send costly signals to allies so that they know that the alliances are still in effect.

25 November 9th, 2022

Today, we discuss terrorism.

25.1 Terrorism

There are problems we will discuss in the following weeks: mosaic-audience problems, the counterfactual challenge, costly signaling, and commitment problems.

We are interested in what terrorism is, what terrorists want, and how to deal with terrorism.

25.1.1 Defining terrorism

Terrorism is hard to define for two reasons:

- Terrorism as moral disapprobation. People often label what they dislike as *terrorism*.
- Changing meaning of the term over time.

Note (Academics' definitions). We note that 84% of academics' definitions of terrorism include violence or force, 65% include political agendas, and 51% include fear or terror.

Note (Publics' definitions). Kertzer and his former Ph.D. student gave a public survey where they varied features in a scenario and measured if people designated the scenario as *terrorism*.

Kertzer found that the more extreme the violence, the more foreign the ties, the more likely Americans would perceive the action as terrorism. Americans don't consider location of attack or civilian-target differentiation. They also found that people tend to perceive groups as more "terrorist-y" than individuals. Motives matter.

Note (Governments' definitions). Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) contains the following definitions of terrorism:

- **Terrorism.** Premeditated, politically-motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.
- **International terrorism.** Terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.
- **Terrorist group.** Any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.

Different agencies have different definitions.

Note (United Nations definition). The United Nations failed to adopt the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism because of definitional debates.^{note}

25.1.2 Changing meaning across time

In the 18th century, terrorism was a policy carried out by state actors and had positive connotations. In the 19th century, we understood terrorism as violence against government leaders by revolutionary movements (assassination of Tzar Alexander II and Archduke Franz Ferdinand). In the 1930s, terrorism changed to mean mass repression by totalitarian states (Mussolini Italy, Nazi Germany, Stalin's "Great Terror"). In the post-World War II era, terrorism as nationalist or revolutionary movements in former colonies (Israel, Kenya, Algeria). In the late 20th century, terrorism definition expands to include nationalist and separatist groups outside colonies.

26 November 10th, 2022

Today, we will discuss the paper/essay and anti-Americanism.

26.1 Grading criteria

- **Argument.** Clear, compelling, creative argument. Ample evidence to justify claims. Present multiple points of view indiscriminately. **[Most important]**
- **Organization.** Well-structured, clear introduction that outlines argument, smooth transitions, and conclusion that ties piece together.
- **Writing skill.** Clear and sophisticated writing, no spelling or grammatical errors. Academic diction.
- **Secondary sources.** Cite at least *four* academic sources. Properly cite them, any citation style is accepted.

26.2 Anti-Americanism

Definition 26.1 (Anti-Americanism). Anti-Americanism is a bias or prejudice against the United States that takes multiple forms.

Recall that bias is related to confirmation and disconfirmation bias, where people with different biases may interpret events differently (whether or not they support or dislike America).

Anti-Americanism is also multidimensional. There are many different dimensions to anti-Americanism, people may dislike the domestic politics, foreign policy, etc. People can have attitudes towards different dimensions of Americanism.

26.3 Alliances

There are differences between formal written partnerships in treaties and informal partnerships. There are challenges in maintaining alliances in the context of a patron-protege model.

The patron might fear entrapment, independence, free-riding. The protege fears abandonment.

While these are alliance maintenance, they are also challenges of alliance creation. Formalization of an alliance creates this dilemma because lack of an alliance creates an abandonment issue, but a formal alliance may entrap the patron. An ambiguous alliance structure threads the needle between these two states.

27 November 14th, 2022

Today, we continue our discussion of terrorism.

27.1 What terrorists want

Pape, Abrahms, and Kyle and Walter provide different answers.

27.1.1 Pape (2003)

Terrorists are rational actors with specific objectives and carry out attacks to advance objectives.

Note. Pape's study has a methodological error: *selection on dependent variable*. One example is looking at whether or not attractiveness is correlated with political success, and only looking at politicians who are above average – we are missing out on half of the distribution and correlated trends.

27.1.2 Abrahms (2007)

Abrahms says that terrorists just want friends, they are social solidarity seekers.

27.1.3 Kydd and Walter (2006)

For Kydd and Walter, terrorism is viewed as costly signaling. Actions reducing uncertainty about type of actor despite incentives to misrepresent (e.g. tying hands, sinking costs).

Terrorist groups have multiple goals: regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control, status quo maintenance.

Kydd and Walter posit that terrorists want to change peoples' beliefs about your power, resolve, and trustworthiness over the government or the population (*targets of persuasion*).

	Government	Population
Power	Attrition	Intimidation
Resolve	Attrition	Outbidding
Trustworthiness	Spoiling	Provocation

Table 4: Terrorism as costly signaling. Kydd and Walter model about terrorists' mechanisms.

- **Attrition.** Terrorists engage in *attrition* (continuation of launching rockets, etc.) to convince governments of their power and resolve.
- **Intimidation.** Terrorists engage in *intimidation* to convince the population that they will punish civilians if they support the government and convince them that the government is too weak to protect them. For example, car bombings, mass killings of civilians, assassinations of heads of government.

Note. Assumes that population requires protection but does not matter from whom.

- **Outbidding.** Terrorists engage in outbidding (with other groups and factions) to convince populations that their group is more hard-line and extreme than other groups.

Note. This occurs if there are multiple groups that are competing over the same population. This occurs in crowded primary elections in the United States. Consider how primary candidate winners tend to lean on the extreme sides of the spectrum, i.e. Bernie Sanders, Donald Trump.

- **Spoiling.** Terrorists engage in *spoiling* within groups to convince governments that they are not trustworthy.

The idea is that many terrorist organizations have more moderate wings and more radical wings. The moderate wing may want to provide public goods and social services; this is the subset of the group that governments have peace treaties with. The extreme wing may not want this to happen and engage in *spoiling* by coordinating attacks to ruin the peace.

The extremists are trying to convince the government that the moderates are not trustworthy because they cannot control the entire organization.

- **Provocation.** Terrorists engage in *provocation* to convince the population to support them and not the government. Terrorists engage in tactics that bait governments to overreact. This creates collateral damage and radicalizes the local population.

27.2 Dealing with terrorism

We typically discuss terrorism as a *tactic*. It is difficult to declare war on a tactic and not an organization.

There have been many treatments of counter-terrorism:

- The government typically defines progress against terrorism in terms of military success and number of casualties.
- Terrorism is also a network of loose affiliates; things are more challenging to count and attack. The United States used to refer to operational success against specific military actors and targets, but this is different from defeating terrorism broadly.
- Another policy and approach is treating terrorism like crime. We can never eliminate crime but we can reduce it. There has been backlash against these kinds of approaches.

Mueller (2005) gives a different perspective. He posits that fears about terrorism are overblown. Mueller does cost-benefit analysis on different counter-terrorism tactics.

Note. We can think about terrorism more broadly in terms of asymmetric conflicts. We will discuss asymmetric conflicts next class.

28 November 16th, 2022

Today, we discuss counterinsurgency.

28.1 Counterinsurgency and asymmetric conflict

We note that the United States spent \$754B on military spending in 2021. This is approximately the total military spending of the next fourteen countries.

Primacy refers to the fact that the United States is the most militarily prominent. The U.S. has *command of the commons*. This means that the United States can credibly deny common goods (like land, airspace, water) from other states due to its military strength.

Definition 28.1 (The commons). *Commons* are areas that are not owned by any single actor, but provide access to the rest of the world.

Note. This is useful in wartime and used as a *deterrant* in peacetime.

Asymmetric conflict is a conflict where we have a strong actor fighting a weak actor. Some examples include terrorism, biological weapons, and counterinsurgency (COIN).

COIN is a specific type of asymmetric conflict between a government or intervening power and an insurgent group. Other actors include populations and the international community.

28.1.1 COIN doctrine

Kircullen defines 28 articles for winning COIN (influences FM-23, strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan).

Note. Know your turf. Diagnose the problem. Organize for intelligence / inter-agency operations. Travel light. Find a political/cultural advisor. Train squad leaders and trust them. Talent over rank. Have a game plan. Establish presence. Avoid knee-jerk responses. Prepare for handover from day one. Win hearts and minds. Start easy. Remember global audiences. Engage the women, beware the children. Local forces should mirror the enemy. Practice armed civil affairs.

Note. COIN is armed social work. We send military to other countries to solve problems and build trust with local populations; if we want to win COIN, we become armed social workers.

28.1.2 Feasibility of COIN

As American military strategy abroad moves to increased social work, we see police at home trend towards militarization.

Note. Surplus equipment gets bought by cities and police departments across the United States. This is a contradiction and a bit hypocritical.

There are some challenges to COIN:

- **Difficulty of task.** COIN is like "eating soup with a knife." Kind of dangerous to train military personnel to act like social workers.

Note. Most of the most famous COINs is the British in the Malay emergency.

- **Plurality of actors.** Hard to figure out who the good and bad guys are.
- **High turnover.** Units get redeployed, local knowledge that is formed is quickly lost.
- **Different standards of victory.** Victory for insurgents and counter-insurgents is different. Insurgents do not need to win on the battlefield but counter-insurgents do.

- **Differential interests.** COIN is characterized by a *credible commitment problem*. The credible commitment problem is when the intervening power cannot *credibly* pledge that they will stay forever. Insurgents can stay and fight as long as they have local members.
- **Opportunity costs.** The types of militaries that are good at COIN will not be good at other things. There are trade-offs for specialization, i.e. fighting big wars or fighting small wars.
- **Political costs for intervening power.** COIN takes a long time, the public may not support this.

28.1.3 Violence management

The decline of COIN is followed by a shift to violence management strategies. This is about sending air power and special forces to cause disruption instead of governance.

There are challenges to violence management:

- **Military efficacy, but civilian cost.** COIN is about protecting civilians. Violence management cares about American casualties.
- **Challenges of alliances with local militias.** Alliances of convenient form in violence management. These can be problematic; and local militias have their own agendas (moral hazard, risky driving).
- **Challenge of order.** Violence management does not give an answer of how to produce order.

29 November 17, 2022

Today, we discuss terrorism, counterinsurgency.

29.1 Terrorism

Recall *selection on the dependent variable*, where we sample only from successful event with respect to the dependent variable. This is like survivorship bias. We used this to discuss Pape's study of suicide terrorism.

Recall that Kydd and Walter (2006) think about terrorism as costly signaling.

Note. Kevin wrote a senior thesis paper on terrorism as a function of costly signaling and media density and found interesting results.

29.2 Counterinsurgency

We note that we can pursue counterinsurgency without pursuing a counterinsurgency doctrine.

COIN is one such approach; COIN is armed social work where U.S. military officers are used to help build schools, protect the population, etc. This has two functions: to sway public opinion and public intelligence. On public intelligence, these kinds of actions make the public more inclined to provide intelligence.

Example 29.1. This was prevalent in U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Note. COIN has an informational advantage over population, cultural customs, geography, etc. when conducting these missions.

There is another problem of credible commitment. COIN is expensive and time intensive.

29.3 Reading summary

Terrorism readings:

- **Paper (2003).** Uses example of suicide terrorism to argue that terrorists are strategic rational actors.
- **Abrahms (2007).** Argues that terrorists are "solidarity-seeking" and terrorists are people that come together to celebrate social bonds and celebrate it in a way that may cause internal harm.
- **Mueller (2005).** Argues that terrorism is a conflated threat.
- **Kydd and Walter (2006).** Terrorism is a strategic action and is costly signaling.

Counterinsurgency and asymmetric conflict readings:

- **Malkasian (2021).** Outlines precepts of COIN doctrine. Uses Afghan strategy review in Obama administration to understand the political cost of COIN, the idea of divergent interests and asymmetric stakes; the United States timeline is often shorter than terrorists'.
- **Brathwaite and Konaev (2019).** Example of terrorism and counterinsurgency as a conflict over information. Makes the argument that in the context of urban counterinsurgency, in ethnically homogenous cities or segregated cities, it makes gathering information harder because it increases the risk to the particular ethnic group; in ethnically heterogeneous cities or integrated cities, it makes public opinion harder.

30 November 21st, 2022

Today, Professor Elenora Mattiacci from Amherst College is giving a guest lecture on nuclear weapons.

30.1 Nuclear weapons

Definition 30.1 (Priors). *Priors* are ideas that you bring with you wherever you go. In this case, they are latent opinions or biases you have before we go through research and evidence.

The first five states to acquire nuclear weapons are the United States (1945), Soviet Union (1949), Great Britain (1952), France (1960), and China (1964).

30.1.1 Non-proliferation treaty

The non-proliferation treaty (NPT) was opened for signature in 1968, entered into force in 1970, and extended indefinitely in May 1995. There are 191 states that have joined the treaty. There are five nuclear weapons states (U.S., Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, China).

There are three key mechanisms in the non-proliferation treaty:

- **Disarmament.** States with nuclear capability reduce their nuclear arsenals.
- **Non-proliferation.** States without nuclear capabilities cannot develop them.
- **Peaceful use.** States without nuclear capability are entitled to nuclear energy.

The goal of the NPT is for nuclear states to disarm; and for non-nuclear states to non-proliferate.

Note. North Korea was a member of the NPT but left.

30.1.2 Dual-use technology

"Atoms for peace and atoms for war are Siamese twins" - Hannes Alfven.

Uranium-enrichment plans can produce either fuel for nuclear reactors or fissile material for nuclear bombs. *Dual-use technologies* refer to technology that has both military and civilian use cases.

30.2 Debates

Experts debate about the following:

- **Horizontal proliferation.** Why do states acquire nuclear weapons?
- **Vertical proliferation.** Why do states acquire more nuclear weapons c. Counter-proliferation: how to stop countries from acquiring nuclear weapons?
- **Counter-proliferation.** How to stop countries from acquiring nuclear weapons?
- **Deterrence/compellence.** How useful are nuclear weapons?

The classic debate is about the spread of nuclear weapons. Is it good or bad?

- **Waltz.** More nuclear weapons may be better: "We don't face happy choices."
 - Countries have to take care of their security.

- Nuclear weapons have *deterrrent power*. They may lead to limited wars that do **not** escalate, as opposed to total wars (Tilly).
- It is too costly for the U.S. to limit proliferation with security guarantees.
- **Sagan.** More nuclear weapons states are a problem: "Many more countries can make nuclear weapons than do."
- The risk of accidents increases.
- Actors in big organizations (like the military) are prone to miscalculation.
- We cannot assume that actors are rational. Can lead to unwarranted escalation. There are communication issues, signals misinterpreted.
- Countries should try to limit proliferation.

30.2.1 Nuclear latency

Nuclear latent states are groups of countries that have the technology necessary to build nuclear weapons but decide not to do so.

Note (Mattiacci). Nuclear programs are the transitional state between no nuclear capability to nuclear capability. She finds that nuclear latency (ENR facilities) make states more likely to start a nuclear weapons program but also to give up on nuclear ambitions.

30.2.2 Atomic ambiguity

We want to understand the effect of nuclear latency on cooperation.

It turns out this depends on what latency looks like:

- **Lower level latency.** For example, lab scale facilities. More overt latency leads to cooperation.
- **Covert latency.** (lower and higher level) leads to less cooperation

Note (Research). Current research looks at whether the U.S. offers unusual cooperative overtures.

31 November 28th, 2022

Today, Dr. Joshua Schwartz is the guest lecturer on drones.

31.1 Drones background

There are different types of drones: ground-based, sea-based, and aerial drones. Aerial drones are most commonly used. Drones are used on different missions, armed and unarmed. Some important drones we will discuss include the RQ-4 Global Hawk, which is used in surveillance, and the MQ-9 reaper, which is an unarmed drone.

We can categorize drones by level of autonomy.

- **Not autonomous.** Human controls drone 100% of the time.
- **Semi-autonomous.** Can perform some missions on its own, but usually with human control.
- **Fully autonomous.** Drone can perform mission without human input.

Another important categorization is about recoverability. *Recoverable drones* are reusable; they can takeoff and land. *Unrecoverable drones* are suicide or kamikaze drones; these are closer to missiles than aircraft.

31.1.1 Advantages and disadvantages

Some advantages of drone usage:

- Drones avoid putting lives at risk. There are moral and strategic benefits. Lives are intrinsically valuable and pilots are valuable military assets.
- Drones are cheaper by an order of magnitude.
- Drones stay in the air longer and loiter. They can reduce the "fog of war" which provides a moral benefit of being able to wait to strike (saving lives).

Note. Another added benefit is that precise weapons can be used in conjunction with drones. For example, the "ninja hellfire" R9X.

Disadvantages include:

- Drones make it easier to wage war.
- Drones are slower than aircraft by an order of magnitude. This makes drones more vulnerable to air defense.
- Drones are more vulnerable to jamming and hacking.

31.2 Effect of drones on terrorism

This is a review of Dr. Schwartz's paper.

Drone pessimists posit that drones may *increase* terrorism:

- Drones may cause blowback within a civilian population. This can motivate a public to aid terrorist groups. Drones then, may be creating more terrorists than they are defeating.

Note. The public can join terrorist groups, provide material support to them, carry out "lone wolf" attacks in their name, or indirectly aid them by failing to provide intelligence. Empirical evidence shows mixed support for the *blowback hypothesis*.

- Drones may empower low-level leaders that have greater preferences for violence. Fewer resources encourage them to attack softer targets like civilians; they are younger and may not understand strategic pitfalls of civilian violence.

Drone optimists posit that drones may *decrease* terrorism:

- Anticipation effects. Drones may disrupt terrorist groups by restricting their movements, reducing their communications, close training camps, and make them more distrustful of allies and new recruits.

Schwartz finds that majority of statistical studies find that *drones reduce terrorism*.

Some policy implications: a strategy to combat terrorism from "over the horizon" could work; this does not mean drones are net positive for the world. Drones may also change patterns of terrorism by causing more targeting of civilians and shifting terrorism to urban areas.

31.2.1 Impact of drones on interstate conflict

Drones have seen increasing usage in interstate conflict. Some impacts include:

- Use of force may be more likely. Because drones avoid putting lives at risk and make it easier to wage war, states may consider using greater force.
- Drones may make escalation less likely. The destruction of a drone may lead to less escalation than destruction of a traditional manned aircraft. This is because drones are less valuable (by an order of magnitude).

32 November 30th, 2022

32.1 Semester review

We recall some themes from the second half of the semester: there are conventional and unconventional threats, process matters, there exist ongoing challenges of democratic foreign policy, restraint versus engagement.

International relations is a complex system. Recall we have the following problems:

- **Counterfactual challenge.** If $X \implies Y$, then $\neg X \implies \neg Y$.
- Hard to identify in presence of **system effects**. Actions have multiple, unintended consequences; harder both to solve problems and to evaluate policies. There is some difficulty making predictions.

One important takeaway from the class is humility. We don't know enough about the world, how it behaves, and how foreign policy will behave in all conditions.

Example 32.1. Forecasts and predictions are hard. The U.S. intelligence community has struggled in both ways. We consider September 11th and the Iraq War: in the former, the U.S. was criticized for not predicting this would happen and in the latter, the U.S. was criticized for predicting the wrong assumption.

One way to make predictions more tractable is *Brier scores*, given by

$$\frac{1}{N} \sum_{t=1}^N (f_t - o_t)^2 \quad (5)$$

where N is the number of forecasts, f_t is the forecast at time t and o_t is the outcome at time t .

Definition 32.2 (Brier scores). The *Brier score* is a strictly proper score function that measures the accuracy of probabilistic predictions. For uni-dimensional predictions, it is strictly equivalent to the mean squared error as applied to predicted probabilities.

32.1.1 U.S. National Intelligence Council forecasts

The megatrends for 2030 are as follows. Note that megatrends are things that have been occurring that the USNIC believes will continue to occur and speed up:

- **Diffusion of power.** There will be no global hegemon, power will be diffuse locally. U.S. and E.U. decline, rise of China, India.
- **Individual empowerment.** Poverty will shrink and the global middle class will grow.
- **Demographic changes.** Rapid global aging. This demographic change will lead to economic slowdown. The rich are aging and the poor are not. The working age population is shrinking in developed countries but growing in developing ones.
- **Growing resource demands.** Climate change will exacerbate environmental conditions and increase demands for resources.
- **Black swans.** Things that are unlikely to happen but if they were to happen, would change the world. These include:
 - Severe pandemic. Rapid climate change. E.U. collapse. China. Iran. Nuclear or cyber war. Solar geomagnetic storms. U.S. disengagement.

32.2 Final exam and looking forward

There are other international relations courses taught in the spring:

- Government 40: Introduction to International Relations with Professor Chaudoin.
- Government 1737: Evaluating the Impacts of Public Policies; Government 1759: Behavioral Insights and Public Policy with Professor Hiscox.
- Government 2710: International Relations: Field Seminar with Professor Kertzer.
- Government 1722: Politics of the Environment and Climate Change with Professor Tingley.

33 December 1st, 2022

Today is the last section!

33.1 Nukes

We note that nukes require the enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of plutonium. This is a *dual-use* technology, technology that has both civilian and military use.

There is an idea of nuclear *latency*, which are technological precursors to nuclear weapons.

Mattiacci notes that overt latency corresponds with cooperation from the United States.

There are two types of nuclear proliferation:

- **Horizontal.** Where the number of states who obtain nuclear weapons increases.
- **Vertical.** Where the number of nuclear weapons in a particular country increases.

The treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), signed in 1968, has three goals:

- **Disarmament.** Attempts to forestall vertical proliferation. States with nuclear capability are committed to reducing their stockpiles and get rid of them.
- **Nonproliferation.** Attempts to forestall horizontal proliferation. States without nuclear capability are committed to *not* developing nuclear weapons. In return, they are guaranteed *peaceful use*.
- **Peaceful use.** States that join the NPT have a legal right to civilian use of nuclear energy.

Note. Monitoring of "safeguarded" facilities is done by a regulatory body known as the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Waltz argues that more nuclear weapons may be better because of deterrence. *Deterrence* is preventing another actor from doing something to you. *Compellence* is using force to coerce other states to do what you want. Waltz says that nuclear weapons are great at deterrence and not great at compellence, because nukes serve as a costly retaliatory threat but not a costly action because of the drastic consequences if used as a tool for compellence.

33.2 Drones

Schwartz says that drones are effective at counterterrorism. He is a *drone optimist*. He argues that this this works in two ways:

- **Anticipation effects.** Drones are disruptive to terrorist operations because of increased monitoring from above.
- **Kinetic effects.** Drones are degrading because drones have the capacity to take out terrorist leaders, which slows down terrorist activities.

Drone pessimists have the opposite view, that drones *increase* terrorism via increased risk tolerance and civilian blowback.

Lin-Greenberg posits the *remote-controlled restraint*: drones limit *escalation* in ways not possible when inhabited assets are used.

Note. Lin-Greenberg's argument is conditional on intervention already involved.

33.3 Review

33.3.1 Hegemony and the liberal international order

Recall that there is a difference between hegemony and empire.

In a hegemonic order, there is one state with a preponderance of power due to economic, military, etc. and influence other states in the *periphery* (but do not enforce total control). Periphery states still retain independent sovereignty and can form relationships with other states. We can represent this using a graph, where the edges represent influence.

In an imperial model, the central authority exert *total control* over periphery states. It can be represented by a graph (rim-less hub and spoke). These edges represent control and can be directed.

- **Kindleberger.** Hegemons provide the *public goods* of international order. This is traditionally interpreted in the context of the United States hegemonic order post World War II; includes public goods like flow of goods, an emphasis on human rights, a norm of territorial integrity (**Fazal**), and multilateral institutions (with often disproportionate influence).

33.3.2 NATO and alliances

One way we think about alliances is that most of them are **asymmetric** — using a patron-protege model and the *alliance dilemma* where the preferences and worries of the patron and protege conflict. One way to resolve this is *reassurance* via costly signals. Generally, the patron gives costly signals to the protege to show commitment.

We also use a hub-and-spoke structure to discuss U.S. alliances in Asia. This is in contrast to NATO, which is densely interconnected.

Note. While the graph structure is the same between alliances and our discussion of hegemony and empire, the graphs have a very different semantic interpretation.

Formal alliances involve formal treaties and military defense.

- **Meijer and Brooks.** Notes that if the U.S. leaves alliances in Europe, European powers would fail to coordinate due to *strategic cacophony*, which are profound continent-wide divergences across all the domains of national defense policies.

33.3.3 The rise of China

In our discussion of the rise of China, we pivoted from Kindleberger's hegemonic stability theory to *power transition theory*.

Power transition theory elucidates two pathways to hegemonic war:

- **Preventive war.** The falling power instigates a war to retain their status as the hegemon.
- **Revisionist war.** The rising power makes a choice to maintain the status quo or change the order. The latter leads to a revisionist war.

This implicates the *problem of other minds* — which is the difficulty of knowing the intentions of other countries. We can think of states being motivated by economic, public, etc. other interests; it is difficult to discern what certain *observable* actions are motivated by.

States rely on *embedded images* to interpret actions. As a state interacts with another state, some actions become sticky, and create a lens with which states interpret another.

- **Rithmire.** China has a continuing interest in economic openness, but filtered through a lens of party-state capitalism; where the lines between state and economy become increasing intertwined and economic threats are perceived as threats to state security.
- **Friedberg.** Provides six perspectives and discusses additive effects and offsetting effects.

33.3.4 Anti-Americanism

Recall anti-Americanism is characterized by bias and multidimensionality. There are three theories about the source of anti-Americanism:

- **Liberal.** What the U.S. represents.
- **Realist I.** What the U.S. does.

Note. This relates to **Flynn et al.** article which motivates U.S. public diplomacy, finding that humanitarian and civic-assistance deployments improve perceptions of the U.S. military and government, and correlate with more positive assessments of U.S. influence.

- **Realist II.** What the U.S. is.
- **Datta.** America should care about anti-Americanism; uses data from public polling data and voting records.

34 December 12th, 2022

This is a summary/notes of readings for the final exam.

34.1 Hegemony and the liberal international order

34.1.1 Kindleberger (1981)

Difficult to distinguish between dominance and leadership. Leadership rejects exploitation and implies a critical function in the provision of *public goods*. In absence of *leadership*, provision of market for distress goods, flow of capital may disappear. Stabilization is provided by the United States in postwar decades, but the United States cannot function as one in the future.

- Dominance happens when country with more power dictates terms to countries with less power, without considering the latter's interests.
- Leadership happens when the dominant power makes countries with less power do things that are against their short-term interest, but the less powerful state can pursue long-term interests.

Note. Leadership can devolve into exploitation, where one party exerts power to produce a result more favorable to it than if the power had not been exerted.

For the world economy to be stable, needs a country that would undertake to provide market for distress goods, flow of capital (global leader) — hegemons provide this kind of public good.

Note. Claims that in the 1960s, the United States has resigned as leader of world economy without a candidate willing to take its place.

The world order is unstable because of a "superfluidity of would-be free riders."

34.1.2 Fazal (2002)

Compliance of state borders has been generally observed. Norm *against territorial conquest* exists; the hegemon needs to buy into the norm to create a norm.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine might lead to more uses of force to challenge borders/threaten the territorial integrity of states.

Note. It seems like Fazal sees the global order in terms of what norms are being promoted and by whom. If Russia's conquest succeeds, the norm of state sovereignty may threaten a U.S.-lead liberal international order.

34.2 The rise of China

34.2.1 Pearson, Rithmire and Tsai (2022)

Contrary to expectations that economic interdependence might lessen security conflict between China and the U.S., there has been an intensification of economic contestation between China and several OECD countries; in particular, changes in China's domestic political economy has generated security dilemma dynamics.

China's approach to the economy is increasingly securitized, developmental goal of economic growth (which required accommodation of private sector) has been overshadowed by a strategy of political control and risk management for regime survival — *party-state capitalism*.

- Blurred distinction between state and private capital.

- Expansion of party-state authority in firms through changes in corporate governance and state-led financial instruments.
- Enforcement of political fealty among various economic actors.

CCP's actions to ensure regime security (in response to perceived threats) generated insecurity in other states; they adopt measures to constrain Chinese firms which reinforces competition between China and other states.

- Economic interdependence critical source of insecurity for both China and global economic partners.
- Firms are scared about China's intentions to weaponize economic relations.

34.2.2 Friedberg (2005)

Friedberg presents six different perspectives on whether we should be optimistic or pessimistic about China's rise.

- **Realism.**

- Optimists claim that China's power is not increasing as rapidly as is often claimed, it has modest/conservative ambitions, and there are a variety of factors that will mitigate the effects of a security dilemma. China has no modern history of extensive territorial conquest nor visible desire to expand; Asia will be bipolar and this, although tense, will be stable; U.S. is a naval power and China is a land power.
- Pessimists believe that China's rising power, expanding aims, and the intense security dilemma will lead to conflict between it and the United States. Throughout history, rising powers, which tended to have expanding interests, were troublemakers as they challenged territorial boundaries, international institutional arrangements, and hierarchies of prestige.

- **Liberalism.**

- Optimists believe in the pacifying power of economic interdependence, international institutions, and democratization. They believe that the process of democratization is already under way in China and is driven largely by economic development and openness to trade (Kantian tripod).
- Pessimists believe that China is an authoritarian regime with an uncertain grip on power, amid a transition to democracy. Nations are most likely to initiate conflict with their neighbors when they are in transition from authoritarianism towards democracy. Ideological differences may tend to reinforce the dynamics of mutual insecurity.

- **Constructivism.**

- Optimists because they believe in the possibility that people can change the world by changing how they think. They believe that China's repeated interactions with the international community will lead to shifts in its strategic culture, in the norms of international behavior accepted by its leaders, and their conception of national identity.
- Pessimists believe that repeated interactions might not necessarily alter existing mental constructs, but rather reinforce them.

Friedberg defines three mechanisms to explain how to analyze the potential range of interactions between the factors highlighted by each of the six camps:

- **Simple preponderance.** Individuals believe that mechanism they have identified are so powerful as to outweigh the effects of any other forces (opposing or reinforcing). Usually held by liberal optimists or realist pessimists.

- **Additive effects.** Future outcome determined by combined effects of similarly aligned causal forces.
- **Offsetting effects.** Some of forces or influences are mutually offsetting.

34.2.3 Nathan and Scobell (2012)

Natahn and Scobell present the rise of China from a Chinese perspective.

They argue that the main tasks of Chinese foreign policy are defensive: to blunt destabilizing influences from abroad, to avoid territorial losses, to reduce its neighbors' suspicions, and to sustain economic growth. China believes that the U.S. is a revisionist power that seeks to curtail China's political influence and harm China's influence, viewing Western powers as militaristic, offense-minded, expansionist, and selfish.

Threats to China described through four concentric rings:

- The first ring is the entire territory that China administers or claims.
- The second ring are countries that border China.
- The third ring are the broader surrounding regions; Northeast Asia, Oceania, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asian.
- The fourth ring is the world beyond China's immediate neighborhood; China entered this ring in the 1990s.

Chinese analysts trained in the United States prescribe to *offensive realism* — come to conclusion that as China rises, the United States will resist, using its power to maintain its privileged position. U.S. defense posture in PACOM and CENTCOM creates a "strategic ring of encirclement."

Yet despite this prognosis, Chinese strategists do not advise China to challenge the United States in the future. They expect the U.S. to remain the global hegemon for several decades. The equilibrium is the maintenance of the current world system with a larger role for China.

34.3 Anti-Americanism

34.3.1 Datta (2009)

Datta finds that there is a positive relationship between favorable attitudes towards the U.S. and voting alignment within the United Nations General Assembly.

Note. Even though we might observe a positive correlation between global attitudes towards the U.S. and voting behavior within the U.N.G.A., other factors may do a better job of predicting voting alignment with the U.S.

Datta defines soft power as "the ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and the values that underlie them." This is in contrast to hard (military) powers.

Datta measures anti-Americanism through national public opinion surveys on people's attitudes towards America; identifies that global attitudes towards the United States have deteriorated from 2000 to 2008.

34.3.2 Flynn, Machain and Stoyan (2019)

Flynn, Machain, and Stoyan focus on humanitarian and civic-assistance deployments to Latin America. Flynn et al. finds that these deployments improve perceptions of the U.S. military and government, and correlate with more positive assessments of U.S. influence.

Case of "civic-assistance" troop deployment in Peru: Peruvians residing in areas that host exercises express attitudes towards the US military and government that are more favorable and indicate greater trust.

Note. Military can be used to build soft power by improving popular perceptions of the U.S. abroad.

34.4 NATO and alliances

34.4.1 Meijer and Brooks (2021)

Meijer and Brooks focuses on NATO and the alliance system in Europe. They argue that Europeans would not be able to achieve defense autonomy following a U.S. pullback (even a partial U.S. pullback).

The polarization of politics has heightened doubts among European policymakers about the long-term reliability of the U.S. security commitment to Europe; Europeans are thinking about pursuing *strategic autonomy* — the institutional capacity to independently plan/conduct military operations and autonomously develop defense capabilities.

Note. European efforts to achieve strategic autonomy will be hampered by two major constraints that are mutually reinforcing: profound defense capacity shortfalls that will be hard to close; *strategic cacophony*, continent-wide differences across all domains of national defense policies, most notably threat perceptions.

These constraints impose a rigid limit on capacity of Europe to achieve strategic autonomy.

34.4.2 Izumikawa (2020)

Izumikawa focuses on the alliance system in East Asia.

Models U.S. alliance network as a *hub-and-spokes* system: a series of bilateral alliances in East Asia (Japan, Korea, Taiwan) where U.S. is the hub and Asian countries are the spokes.

Realists and constructivists emphasize that the system emerged because it was what the U.S. wanted (as it would give U.S. more control over its allies):

- Realists argue that these bilateral alliances actually help the U.S. constrain their allies.
 - **Powerplay hypothesis.** The U.S. created bilateral alliances to restrain South Korea and Taiwan from initiating actions that might entrap the U.S. in an undesired war with Communists.
- Constructivists also argue that the lack of collective identity between the U.S. and its Asian allies in addition to *historical memory* (i.e. of Japan atrocities in World War II) and *regional norms* (sensitivity to sovereignty amongst Asian countries) contributed to this system.

These arguments are flawed because the U.S. desired and sought a multilateral alliance in East Asia. Izumikawa claims that U.S. allies aggressively sought strong bilateral ties with the U.S. for security reasons and as a result, did not focus on developing security ties amongst themselves, resulting in the hub-and-spokes alliance system.

Note. These are *negative connections* between the U.S.'s security ties with its allies and the security ties between its allies. The stronger the U.S. security ties with its allies, the less likely allies are incentivized to strengthen ties with each other. This is known as the *inter-spoke negative connection hypothesis*.

The *hub-spoke negative connection hypothesis* is the following: the stronger the U.S. security ties with one ally, the less willing it is to form new security alliances with other countries. These two phenomena are negatively correlated.

Both the *hub-spoke negative connection hypothesis* and *inter-spoke negative connection hypothesis* is reflected empirically.

34.5 Terrorism

We seek to understand terrorism.

34.5.1 Mueller (2005)

Mueller presents six (rather unusual) propositions:

1. Terrorism generally has only limited direct effects.
2. The costs of terrorism very often comes mostly from the fear and consequent reaction (or overreaction) it inspires.
3. The terrorism industry is a major part of the terrorism problem. The terrorism industry is made up of entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, media, and politicians (i.e. those who stoke fear and encourage overreaction).
4. Policies designed to deal with terrorism should focus more on reducing fear and anxiety as inexpensively as possible than on objectively reducing the rather limited dangers terrorism is likely actually to pose.
5. Doing nothing (or at least refraining from overreacting) after a terrorist attack is not necessarily unacceptable.
6. Despite U.S. overreaction, the campaign against terror is generally going rather well.

34.5.2 Pape (2003)

Pape asserts that suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic designed to coerce modern liberal democracies to make significant territorial concessions; it has been rising because terrorists have learned that it pays (leads to moderate concessions). Thus, western states should pursue policies that focus on improving homeland security over offensive military action.

Suicide terrorism is an extreme form of "the rationality of irrationality", in which an act that is irrational for the individual attackers is meant to demonstrate credibility to a democratic audience that still more and greater attacks are sure to come; coercion is the *paramount objective* of suicide terrorism.

34.5.3 Abrahms (2007)

Abrahms's paper is a rebuke to Pape's. The *strategic model* posits that terrorists are rational actors who attack civilians for political ends (i.e. act as utility maximizers): terrorism is adopted when the expected political return is superior to those of alternative options.

Abrahms considers seven puzzles to the strategic model:

1. Terrorist organizations do not achieve their stated political goals by attacking civilians.
2. Terrorist organizations never use terrorism as a last resort and seldom seize opportunities to become productive nonviolent political parties.
3. Terrorist organizations reflexively reject compromise proposals offering significant policy concessions by the target government.
4. Terrorist organizations have protean political platforms.
5. Terrorist organizations generally carry out anonymous attacks, precluding target countries from making policy concessions.
6. Terrorist organizations with identical political platforms routinely attack each other more than their mutually professed enemy.
7. Terrorist organizations resist disbanding when they consistently fail to achieve their political platforms or when their stated political grievances have been resolved.

Instead, Abrahms considers a *solidarity-seeking model* that posits that people become terrorists to develop strong affective ties with other terrorist members. The *natural systems model* (in organization theory) posits that people participate in organizations not to achieve their official goals, but to experience solidarity with other members. There is evidence that terrorist groups consistently engage in actions to preserve the social unit even at the expense of their stated political goals.

34.5.4 Kydd and Walter (2006)

For Kydd and Walter, terrorism is viewed as costly signaling. Actions reducing uncertainty about type of actor despite incentives to misrepresent (e.g. tying hands, sinking costs).

Terrorist groups have multiple goals: regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control, status quo maintenance.

Kydd and Walter posit that terrorists want to change peoples' beliefs about your power, resolve, and trustworthiness over the government or the population (*targets of persuasion*).

	Government	Population
Power	Attrition	Intimidation
Resolve	Attrition	Outbidding
Trustworthiness	Spoiling	Provocation

Table 5: Terrorism as costly signaling. Kydd and Walter model about terrorists' mechanisms.

- **Attrition.** Terrorists engage in *attrition* (continuation of launching rockets, etc.) to convince governments of their power and resolve.
- **Intimidation.** Terrorists engage in *intimidation* to convince the population that they will punish civilians if they support the government and convince them that the government is too weak to protect them. For example, car bombings, mass killings of civilians, assassinations of heads of government.

Note. Assumes that population requires protection but does not matter from whom.

- **Outbidding.** Terrorists engage in outbidding (with other groups and factions) to convince populations that their group is more hard-line and extreme than other groups.

Note. This occurs if there are multiple groups that are competing over the same population. This occurs in crowded primary elections in the United States. Consider how primary candidate winners tend to lean on the extreme sides of the spectrum, i.e. Bernie Sanders, Donald Trump.

- **Spoiling.** Terrorists engage in *spoiling* within groups to convince governments that they are not trustworthy.

The idea is that many terrorist organizations have more moderate wings and more radical wings. The moderate wing may want to provide public goods and social services; this is the subset of the group that governments have peace treaties with. The extreme wing may not want this to happen and engage in *spoiling* by coordinating attacks to ruin the peace.

The extremists are trying to convince the government that the moderates are not trustworthy because they cannot control the entire organization.

- **Provocation.** Terrorists engage in *provocation* to convince the population to support them and not the government. Terrorists engage in tactics that bait governments to overreact. This creates collateral damage and radicalizes the local population.

34.6 Counterinsurgency and asymmetric conflict

34.6.1 Malkasian (2021)

Outlines precepts of COIN doctrine. Uses Afghan strategy review in Obama administration to understand the political cost of COIN, the idea of divergent interests and asymmetric stakes; the United States timeline is often shorter than terrorists'.

FM 3-24 was a famous counterinsurgency field manual. It called for protecting the population over killing insurgents, training and advising the local army/police with small team of advisers, limiting civilian casualties, winning over population, and building a good and fair government. Effective governance was defined to be one in which leaders are supported by the majority of the population, corruption is low, there is a rule of law, and social/economic development.

34.6.2 Brathwaite and Konaev (2019)

Brathwaite and Konaev consider the effect of ethnic geography on combat effectiveness.

They find that a city's ethnic geography — whether the city is ethnically homogenous, segregated, or intermixed — influences combat effectiveness primarily through intelligence and public opinion. In particular:

- Ethnically homogeneous and segregated cities are inhospitable to human intelligence operations because close-knit community structures facilitate in-group policing and inhibit infiltration.
- It is difficult to maintain positive public opinion in ethnically intermixed and segregated cities due to the presence of multiple and often conflicting audiences.

34.7 Nuclear weapons

34.7.1 Waltz (2003)

Post-WWII, there has been no major war. Waltz posits that this can be explained by the shift from multipolarity to bipolarity to unipolarity and also the introduction of nuclear weapons.

Self-help is how states themselves in an anarchic world by providing for their own security. Waltz claims that the chance of peace rises if states can achieve their most important ends without force and costs of war rise in relation to possible gains.

States can dissuade another state from attacking through dissuasion by defense or dissuasion by deterrence. The former is when states build defenses to deter attacks and the latter is deterrence due to expected and extreme punishments for attacking.

If nuclear weapons make the offense more effective and the blackmailer's threat more compelling, they will be bad for the world. However, if defense and deterrence are made easier and more reliable by the spread of nuclear weapons, they are good for the world.

34.7.2 Mattiacci et al. (2021)

Nuclear latency is the technological precursors to nuclear weapons (i.e. uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing ability).

The ambiguous nature of nuclear latency creates uncertainty about the intention of its possessors and impacts cooperation. Possession of overt lab-scale enrichment and reprocessing facilities is correlated with higher cooperation from the United States. However, if this becomes covert pilot-scale facilities (which are much further along in the process), then the relationship is reversed. Concerted efforts to keep nuclear facilities a secret is correlated with lower cooperation from the U.S.

34.8 Drones and emerging technologies

34.8.1 Schwartz et al. (2022)

The paper finds that armed-drones are associated with significant reductions in terrorism and can serve as a counter-terrorism tool in some cases. Unlike previous studies, this one focuses on a cross-national context.

Drone *optimists* contend that armed drones reduce a country's vulnerability to terrorism by disrupting and degrading militant organizations; drone *pessimists* claim that it provokes higher levels of terrorism by causing backlash among civilians and empowering lower-level militants that have greater preference for violence.

34.8.2 Lin-Greenberg (2022)

Existing literature highlights increased conflict initiation when using drones. This paper proposes remote-controlled restraint: drones limit escalation in ways not possible when inhabited assets used. To test this, this paper looks at comparative wargames